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Democratic Conditions
Barry Sullivan*
Two nations; between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy;
who are as ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they
were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; who are
formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by
different manners, and are not governed by the same laws. . . . THE RICH AND
THE POOR.
—Benjamin Disraeli1
With us the great divisions of society are not the rich and poor, but white
and black; and all the former, the poor as well as the rich, belong to the
upper class, and are respected and treated as equals, if honest and
industrious; and hence have a position and pride of character of which
neither poverty nor misfortune can deprive them.
—John C. Calhoun2
The government [the founders] devised was defective from the start,
requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social
* Cooney & Conway Chair in Advocacy and George Anastaplo Professor of Constitutional Law
and History, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. The author would like to thank Maciej
Bernatt, John Dehn, James Gathii, Michael Kaufman, Alfred S. Konefsky, Steven Ramirez, Alan
Raphael, Joan M. Shaughnessy, and Winnifred Fallers Sullivan for thoughtful comments on an
earlier draft; Pilar Mendez, William Nye, and Savannah Theil for expert research assistance; Loyola
Law Librarian Julienne Grant for additional research assistance; and the Cooney & Conway Chair
and Loyola Law School Faculty Research Funds for financial support. The usual stipulation applies.
Finally, the author would like to dedicate this article to his friend, Professor Theodore C. DeLaney,
Jr., who began his working life as a custodian at Washington and Lee University and concluded his
career there as Chair of the Department of History. His teaching—both of American history and of
how to live a good life—has inspired generations of students and colleagues. So, too, has his radiant
faith, with which he has faced many challenges, always with modesty and courage, and always
speaking truth to power. See, e.g., Theodore C. DeLaney, Jr., Professor of History Emeritus,
Washington & Lee University, Convocation Address (Sept. 5, 2018), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhQduSpLG8E [https://perma.cc/8WNU-WG5K].
1. BENJAMIN DISRAELI, SYBIL OR THE TWO NATIONS 76–77 (1845).
2. John C. Calhoun, On the Oregon Bill (June 27, 1848), in JOHN C. CALHOUN, SPEECHES OF
JOHN C. CALHOUN DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND IN THE SENATE OF THE
UNITED STATES 505–06 (Richard J. Crallé ed., 1883).
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transformation to attain the system of constitutional government, and its
respect for individual freedoms and the human rights, that we hold as
fundamental today.
—Thurgood Marshall3
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INTRODUCTION
Americans like to boast, as Gerald R. Ford put it when he assumed the
duties of the presidency on that fateful day in August 1974, that “[h]ere
the people rule.”4 Or, as Abraham Lincoln observed more than a century
before, ours is a “government of the people, by the people, and for the
people.”5 But many Americans are inclined to doubt the truth of such
sentiments today. Far from believing that “[h]ere the people rule,” many
Americans, seemingly without regard to racial or ethnic identity or
political affiliation, now feel that they have little or no voice or influence
in their government. On the contrary, they believe that government is
controlled by an elite of one sort or another that is indifferent to their
problems and frequently hostile or indifferent to their values,
commitments, and viewpoints.
In a recent study of rural America, for example, the well-known
sociologist Robert Wuthnow writes that, “[w]hether Washington was ‘up
there,’ ‘down there,’ or someplace else in people’s minds, it was so far
3. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
4. Gerald R. Ford, Remarks Upon Taking the Oath of Office as President at the White House
(Aug.
9,
1974),
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/speeches/740001.asp
[https://perma.cc/B9P6-N67H].
5. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863), in THE LIBRARY
OF AMERICA, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859–1865, at 536 (Roy P. Basler
ed., 1989).
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away that the people” whom he and his research team interviewed
“couldn’t understand it.”6 According to Professor Wuthnow, his
respondents perceived Washington to be so far away that they felt
helpless.7 Moreover, just as his respondents professed that they could not
understand Washington, they were also pretty sure that “Washington
didn’t understand them. ‘They’re just not listening to us out here.’”8
Indeed, Professor Wuthnow’s respondents thought that Washington was
not listening to “anybody small”—not to “the small farmer, the smallbusiness owner, or people living in small places.”9 In their view,
Washington was listening only to “somebody ‘big’”—to “the big
interests, big cities, big business, and big farmers. Washington itself was
big, too big to get anything done, run by the big boys who only knew how
to talk big. It was ‘a bunch of big-headed guys’ there with brilliant ideas
that didn’t work.”10
In a similar vein, Joan Williams, a leading expert on employment law
and the sociology of work, writes:
I focus on a simple message: when you leave the two-thirds of
Americans without college degrees out of your vision of the good life,
they notice. And when elites commit to equality for many different
groups but arrogantly dismiss “the dark rigidity of fundamentalist rural
America,” this is a recipe for extreme alienation among working class
whites. Deriding “political correctness” becomes a way for lessprivileged whites to express their fury at the snobbery of moreprivileged whites. . . . [T]he hidden injuries of class now have become
visible in politics so polarized that our democracy is threatened.11
6. ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND: DECLINE AND RAGE IN SMALL-TOWN AMERICA 98
(2018).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 99.
10. Id.; see also Eduardo Porter, The Hard Truths of Trying to ‘Save’ the Rural Economy, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/14/opinion/rural-americatrump-decline.html?searchResultPosition=37 [https://perma.cc/M43F-T8FH] (describing the
inadequacy of many of the proposals put forth to reverse the economic downturn in rural America).
11. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, WHITE WORKING CLASS: OVERCOMING CLASS CLUELESSNESS IN
AMERICA 4 (2017) (footnotes omitted); see also ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN
THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT 136–37 (2016) (“You are
patiently standing in a long line leading up a hill . . . . You are situated in the middle of this line,
along with others who are also white, older, Christian, and predominantly male. . . . You see people
cutting in line ahead of you! . . . As they cut in, it feels you are being moved back. How can they
just do that? Who are they? Some are black. . . . Women, immigrants, refugees, public sector
workers—where will it end? Your money is running through a liberal sympathy sieve you don’t
control or agree with. . . . And President Obama: how did he rise so high?”); id. at 215 (“[A]s
members of the right, [the older white men] had objected in principle to cutting in line, and disliked
the overused word ‘victim.’ Still—and this was unsayable—they were beginning to feel like
victims. Others had moved forward; they were the left behind. They disliked the word ‘suffer,’ but
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Professor Williams adds that, “Once the elite cast the white working
class out of its ambit of responsibility, the elite did what elites do. They
ignored those who print their New York Times, make their KitchenAides,
tell them at the doctor’s to undress from the waist down.”12 According to
Professor Williams, “[t]he professional class first stopped noticing, and
then started condescending. Class cluelessness became class
callousness.”13
The alienation that many feel—particularly, but not exclusively those
who live in relatively homogeneous, rural communities—is directed at
society as well as government, and it seems as much the product of
cultural concerns as of concerns about rising economic inequality. Many
believe that their values, which once were mainstream and dominant,
have now been marginalized.14 Political scientists Pippa Norris and
Ronald Inglehart explain:
Traditional identities concerning faith, family, ethnicity, and nation,
common in the mid-twentieth century, are no longer predominant in
Western societies, especially among cultural elites. A tipping point has
emerged where social conservatives have become increasingly resentful
at finding themselves becoming minorities on the losing side of history.
They may also feel that they reflect the “real” majority in America—
especially if they live in isolated communities where friends, family,
and neighbors share similar values, if they get much of their political
information from conservative media bubbles like Fox TV and likeminded Facebook groups, and if opinion-leaders [are] willing to
champion and articulate socially transgressive opinions. Politicians
thereby have opportunities to mobilize social conservatives by blaming
the erosion of traditional moral values on liberal elites, corrupt
politicians, and the mainstream media, as well as denigrating rising out-

they had suffered from wage cuts, the dream trap, and the covert dishonor of being the one group
everyone thought stood unfairly ahead of the line.”); AMY GOLDSTEIN, JANESVILLE: AN
AMERICAN STORY 291 (2017) (“Business people and economic development leaders had been
urging GM to designate the plant as [permanently] closed, so that its site could be sold off and
reused . . . . On that morning [when the re-designation was announced], they celebrated. Many of
its former workers, however, had been hoping all this time that the plant would someday reopen.
For them, the morning’s news, particularly as the U.S. auto industry was reaching record sales, was
like a death knell.”).
12. WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 130 (footnote omitted).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., PIPPA NORRIS & RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURAL BACKLASH: TRUMP, BREXIT,
AND AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM 16 (2019) “(The Interwar generation of non-college educated
white men—until recently the politically and socially dominant group in Western cultures—has
reached a tipping point at which their hegemonic status, power, and privilege is fading. Their values
make them potential supporters for parties and leaders promising to restore national sovereignty
(Make America Great Again), restrict immigration and multicultural diversity (Build a Wall), and
defend traditional religious and conventional moral values . . . .”).
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groups who benefit from socially liberal attitudes and policies, such as
women, racial minorities, and immigrants.15

The social reality is more complex, of course, than that perceived by
those whom Norris and Inglehart identify as “social conservatives.”16 As
Norris and Inglehart suggest, politicians often try to manipulate the “left
behind”17 with false assurances of being able to turn back the clock, just
15. Id. at 47–48 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court has been a special target of social
conservatives since the time of Chief Justice Warren. See, e.g., JOEL WILLIAM FRIEDMAN,
CHAMPION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: JUDGE JOHN MINOR WISDOM 97–98 (2009) (discussing the so-called
“Southern Manifesto,” in which nineteen southern Senators and nearly eighty Members of
Congress condemned the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), as a federal judicial usurpation of local authority); FRANK T. READ & LUCY S. MCGOUGH,
LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH 62–63 (1978) (same);
Chris Hickman, Courting the Right: Richard Nixon’s 1968 Campaign Against the Warren Court,
36 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 287 (2011) (discussing Nixon’s mobilization of disapproval of the Warren
Court). During the 2016 presidential election campaign, the Republican presidential candidate went
further than merely criticizing the Court, or promising to alter its direction, by publishing a list of
conservative jurists from which he pledged to fill the Supreme Court vacancy created by the death
of Justice Antonin Scalia (and kept open by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s refusal to
take up the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland). See CARL HULSE, CONFIRMATION BIAS: INSIDE
WASHINGTON’S WAR OVER THE SUPREME COURT, FROM SCALIA’S DEATH TO JUSTICE
KAVANAUGH 52 (2019) (explaining that no previous presidential candidate had published such a
list); id. at 289–90 (suggesting that making the vacancy a central campaign issue clearly had played
a crucial role in the 2016 election and, given the divergence between the popular and electoral
votes, may well have been decisive).
16. The social reality may also be darker, inasmuch as it seemingly includes nostalgia for certain
unhealthy social phenomena, such as the notion of a racial hierarchy. In his recent study of attitudes
towards health, gun, and education policies in Tennessee, Missouri, and Kansas, respectively,
Jonathan M. Metzl notes that factors such as anxieties among whites about the persistence of racial
hierarchy cause them to embrace policies that are not only contrary to their material interests, but
literally self-destructive. Professor Metzl writes:
Succinctly put, a host of complex anxieties prompt increasing numbers of white
Americans . . . to support right-wing politicians and policies, even when these policies
actually harm white Americans at growing rates. As these policy agendas spread from
Southern and midwestern legislatures into the halls of Congress and the White House,
ever-more white Americans are then, literally, dying of whiteness. This is because white
America’s investment in maintaining an imagined place atop a racial hierarchy—that is,
an investment in a sense of whiteness—ironically harms the aggregate well-being of US
whites as a demographic group, thereby making whiteness itself a negative health
indicator.
JONATHAN M. METZL, DYING OF WHITENESS: HOW THE POLITICS OF RACIAL RESENTMENT IS
KILLING AMERICA’S HEARTLAND 9 (2019). In Professor Metzl’s view, “liberal Americans” have
been “slow to realize” that those who support policies that are seemingly contrary to their own
material self-interest do so not out of ignorance of the consequences, but “in support of larger
prejudices and ideals.” Id. at 5–6.
17. Professor Wuthnow uses the term to describe those who live outside large urban areas and
have experienced the effects of economic globalization and changing cultural values. See
WUTHNOW, supra note 6, at 11–12. Interestingly, the English sociologist Robbie Shilliam notes
that, from the 1840s onwards, the part-vagrant, casual and unskilled workers who lived in
England’s urban slums “were given a new name—the residuum or ‘left behind.’” ROBBIE
SHILLIAM, RACE AND THE UNDESERVING POOR 34 (2018). At the present time, Professor Shilliam
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as they rely on “dog whistle politics” to exploit their fears and
insecurities.18
The “left behind” may look with envy upon what they imagine to be
the preferred position of those who allegedly “benefit from socially
liberal attitudes and policies, such as women, racial minorities, and
immigrants,”19 but the reality of that preferred position is highly
questionable, and, if it exists at all, it does so only for the fortunate few.
For example, most women are not partners in large law firms, highly paid
executives, or members of corporate boards; many continue to work long
hours for less pay than their male counterparts;20 and many suffer sexual
harassment in the workplace or domestic violence at home.21 At best,
they work under the same difficult conditions as their male co-workers
and often live paycheck to paycheck, as their male co-workers do.22 Most
young people of color are not the beneficiaries of affirmative action
programs.23 Indeed, notwithstanding the election of an African-American
notes,
being left behind [in England] connotes a racialized socio-economic distance, that is, an
advantage attached to whiteness that has relatively diminished rather than zero-sum
declined. . . . [They] are not incidentally white; the diminution of the benefits that
whiteness once afforded is what makes them feel left behind. The vote for Brexit must
be placed within the rise and fall of the ‘white working class,’ a trajectory managed
predominantly by the political elites.
Id. at 156 (citations omitted). On this account, the “white working class” includes only those who
are ethnically English, so that European immigrants are necessarily considered “non-white.” Id. at
162–63.
18. See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS
HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 4 (2014) (describing the phrase
“dog whistle politics” and its use as a “complicated phenomenon”).
19. See NORRIS & INGLEHART, supra note 14, at 48 (discussing how politicians can attack
certain groups of people to mobilize social conservatives).
20. See, e.g., Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends,
and Explanations, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 789, 793–800 (2017), https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/
pdfplus/10.1257/jel.20160995 [https://perma.cc/YU9H-PEAA] (featuring statistics that illustrate
the gender gap).
21. See Sharon O’Malley, Workplace Sexual Harassment, CQ RESEARCHER (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2017102700 [https://perma.cc/
A9NE-AGWY] (explaining that despite the “Me Too” movement, sexual harassment persists in the
workplace, especially with respect to women in low-skilled, low-wage jobs); Joan S. Meier,
Johnson’s Differentiation Theory: Is It Really Empirically Supported?, 12 J. CHILD CUSTODY 1,
12, 23 (2015) (discussing incidence of domestic violence).
22. See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, ANNUAL SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENTS (1968–2018).
23. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 242 (2010) (“Diversity-driven affirmative action, as described and
implemented today, sends a different message. The message is that ‘some of us’ will gain inclusion.
As a policy, it is blind to those who are beyond its reach, the colored faces at the bottom of the
well.”); see also JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA (2017) (discussing effects of criminal justice policies and over-incarceration on young
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president and the much-trumpeted arrival of “post-racialism,”24 the
nation’s long history of racial prejudice and exclusion remains intact.25
Racial discrimination persists in both its overt and more subtle forms,26
and the effects of historical subordination and discrimination will likely
shape the future, as they do the present.27 Similarly, discrimination
black men).
24. William M. Carter, Jr., The Paradox of Political Power: Post-Racialism, Equal Protection,
and Democracy, 61 EMORY L.J. 1123, 1125–28 (2012) (discussing post-racialism).
25. The Commonwealth of Virginia recently marked the four hundredth anniversary of the
founding of Jamestown, which was widely celebrated as marking the beginning of democracy in
America. Gregory S. Schneider, Michael E. Ruane & Laura Vozzella, Jamestown Ceremony Marks
Birth of Democracy in America; Black Va. Legislators Skip Because of Trump, WASH. POST (July
30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/jamestown-ceremony-marksbirth-of-democracy-in-america-black-va-legislators-skip-because-of-trump/2019/07/30/d5db7e10
-b240-11e9-8949-5f36ff92706e_story.html [https://perma.cc/AV85-NWTT]. Less than a month
later, Virginia marked the four hundredth anniversary of the arrival of the first African slaves.
Gregory S. Schneider, Virginia Marks the Dawn of American Slavery in 1619 with Solemn Speeches
and Songs, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2019), https://beta.washingtonpost.com/local/virginiapolitics/virginia-marks-the-dawn-of-american-slavery-in-1619-with-solemn-ceremonies-speeches
-songs/2019/08/24/adbc84ae-c66f-11e9-9986-1fb3e4397be4_story.html [https://perma.cc/F3LVMM7B] (reporting that Virginia marked the four hundredth anniversary of the arrival of the first
African slaves).
26. See Matthew W. Hughey, White Backlash in the ‘Post-Racial’ United States, 37 ETHNIC &
RACIAL STUD. REV. 721, 722–28 (2014) (discussing contemporary white racial identity). Ta-Nehisi
Coates has observed that:
Racism greeted Obama in both his primary and general election campaigns in 2008.
Photos were circulated of him in Somali garb. Rush Limbaugh dubbed him “Barack the
Magic Negro.” Roger Stone . . . claimed that Michelle Obama could be heard on tape
yelling “Whitey.” Detractors circulated emails claiming that the future first lady had
written a racist senior thesis while at Princeton. A fifth of all West Virginia Democratic
primary voters in 2008 openly admitted that race had influenced their vote. . . . After
Obama won the presidency in defiance of these racial headwinds, traffic to the whitesupremacist website Stormfront increased sixfold. . . . [J]ust before the Democratic
National Convention, the FBI uncovered an assassination plot hatched by white
supremacists in Denver.
TA-NEHISI COATES, WE WERE EIGHT YEARS IN POWER: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 326–27 (2017).
Overt displays of racism continued, not only during the campaign, but throughout both terms of the
Obama presidency; as some political scientists have noted, that followed a trend that long antedated
President Obama’s arrival on the scene. See, e.g., Adam M. Enders & Jamil S. Scott, The Increasing
Racialization of American Electoral Politics, 1988–2016, 47 AM. POL. RES. 275, 276–77 (2019)
(noting racist trends during campaigns and elections); Michael Tesler, The Return of OldFashioned Racism to White Americans’ Partisan Preferences in the Early Obama Era, 75 J. POL.
110 (2013) (commenting on racism directed at President Obama during his electoral campaigns
and terms of office).
27. The persistent legacy of discrimination is severe, multi-faceted, and sometimes subtle. For
example, the ease with which wealth is transferred (by those who have it) from one generation to
another tends to perpetuate and compound the wealth gap produced by discrimination. See, e.g.,
Robert B. Williams, Wealth Privilege and the Racial Wealth Gap: A Case Study in Economic
Stratification, 44 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 303, 304 (2017) (explaining why the racial wealth gap
exceeds the income gap). One example of this phenomenon relates to the unavailability of VA
mortgages to African American veterans after World War II. Because of discrimination, many
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against immigrants—and those thought to be immigrants—is stronger
than it has been in many decades.28
Many of the points that Professors Williams and Wuthnow make about
elite attitudes towards the “left behind” could also be made with respect
to the seeming indifference of governing elites to the plight of the urban
poor (particularly, but not exclusively people of color) who frequently
lack adequate access to jobs, housing, healthcare, education, and even
policing, despite the fact that those public goods may be plentiful only a
few blocks away.29 With respect to both of these groups, the gulf between

African American veterans remained renters or were able to purchase homes only in less desirable
neighborhoods, while many white veterans were able to buy homes in more desirable
neighborhoods with government financial assistance and thereby accumulated substantial wealth
for their families. As Richard Rothstein points out, “In 1948, for example, Levittown homes sold
for about $8,000, or about $75,000 in today’s dollars. Now, properties in Levittown without major
remodeling . . . sell for $350,000 and up. White working-class families who bought those homes in
1948 have gained, over three generations, more than $200,000 in wealth.” RICHARD ROTHSTEIN,
THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED
AMERICA 182 (2017); see also Chenoa A. Flippen, Racial and Ethnic Inequality in Homeownership
and Housing Equity, 42 SOC. Q. 121, 144 (2001) (citation omitted) (“Housing constitutes both the
largest expenditure and the largest single asset among the vast majority of households. . . . [I]t also
confers numerous tax and inflation protection benefits. . . . [and] contributes to racial and ethnic
inequality in wealth accumulation more generally. . . . [W]ealth and residential inequalities both
reflect and reinforce racial stratification through their influence on access to educational and
occupational opportunities.”).
28. See, e.g., Joni Hersch, Colorism Against Legal Immigrants to the United States, 62 AM.
BEHAV. SCI. 2117, 2118–19 (2018) (discrimination against immigrants has increased over the past
twenty years, particularly during the past five years, and especially against immigrants of color, or
those who are perceived to be immigrants of color). See also MICHAEL G. HANCHARD, THE
SPECTRE OF RACE: HOW DISCRIMINATION HAUNTS WESTERN DEMOCRACY 213 (2018):
Ironically, contemporary anti-immigrant movements in many nation-states more
accurately reflect the history of immigration policies, controls, and debates than do more
liberal arguments. For example, . . . Barack Obama stated on numerous occasions the
oft-cited cliché that the United States was—and is—a nation of immigrants, to which we
can respond by noting that Japanese internment during World War II, the Asian
Exclusion Act, and the Alien and Sedition Acts determined which racial, ethno-national,
and ideological others were interpreted as potential dangers and not potential or actual
citizens. It will be more accurate to restate this homily in the following way: that most
states with histories of significant immigration have selectively accepted migration flows
from certain parts of the world more readily than from other parts. Some immigrant
groups have been more readily integrated into national societies than others.
29. See generally ALEX KOTLOWITZ, AN AMERICAN SUMMER: LOVE AND DEATH IN CHICAGO
(2019); PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY IN
AMERICA (2017); MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY
(2016); TOMMIE SHELBY, DARK GHETTOS: INJUSTICE, DISSENT, AND REFORM (2016); WILLIAM
JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (Vintage
Books 1997) (1996); ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE NO CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF TWO
BOYS GROWING UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA (1991); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed. 2012).
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the promises that politicians make and the goods they deliver is often
great and persistent.30
In a larger sense, there seems to be a disconnect between the rhetoric
of constitutional democracy and its reality—what citizens believe their
proper role to be and what the realities of our government and society
allow them to be. That disconnect is not surprising, perhaps, in the
context of a constitutional system that was designed with numerous
mechanisms to protect government—particularly the federal
government—from too great or too immediate a dependence on the
people. That structural choice was made for the laudable purposes of
promoting deliberation in government and ensuring the essential stability
of government policy against the possibly shifting winds of public
opinion. However, the effects of that choice are likely to be magnified—
and distorted—when government and society are controlled by elites
whose own experiences, outlooks, and social networks are far different
from those of most citizens. That experiential, cultural, and social gulf is
an obstacle to understanding, let alone crediting, the views and
perspectives of others. In any event, the troubling phenomena that social
scientists have identified and discussed are deeply rooted in our history
and institutions.
What, then, are the conditions of democracy? It is easier, perhaps, to
answer that question by identifying some of the obstacles to democratic
30. For example, Senator Obama’s presidential campaign promised “change you can believe
in,” but President Obama followed many of the same policies as his predecessors, effectively
favoring the interests of big business over those of the working class and the poor, and there was a
wide gulf between his promises and achievements. See, e.g., Robert Reich, Why Democrats Share
the Blame for the Rise of Donald Trump, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2020/feb/01/donald-trump-impeachment-trial-state-of-the-union [https://perma.cc/
J8G3-2GAC] (“Democrats had occupied the White House for 16 of the 24 years before Trump’s
election, and in that time scored some important victories for working families . . . . But Democrats
did nothing to change the vicious cycle of wealth and power that had rigged the economy for the
benefit of those at the top and undermined the working class.”); Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor,
Obama’s Legacy Is Hurting Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2020, at A27 (“But if the person who
inspired an unprecedented outpouring was unable to significantly change the material reality of
ordinary African-American voters, how could someone with less charisma do so? Mr. Obama of
course had achievements, but there was a mismatch in the scale of what was promised and what
was delivered.”). But see METZL, supra note 16, at 8 (noting that, notwithstanding the politicians’
failure to deliver significant material benefits, “[w]hite backlash politics gave certain white
populations the sensation of winning, particularly by upending the gains of minorities and liberals;
yet the victories came at a steep cost”). As Professor Metzl further explains, “the construction of
whiteness as a castle under siege, and the policies that sustain it, comes with certain benefits—such
as the ability to carry guns in public without automatically being seen as suspect. But this
construction works overtime to obscure the plagues that arise from within the castle walls. Evermore guns, or ever-more tax cuts or health care system rejections, promise to make the citizenry
great again or to afford protection but in reality only weaken the foundation and heighten the
calculus of risk.” Id. at 283.
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government. When, for example, a democratic society is characterized by
great disparities of wealth and status,31 racial segregation and
discrimination, inequality of opportunity (particularly with respect to
education and employment), and an absence of solidarity or sense of
common purpose among its citizens, the circumstances will be fraught.
So too when politicians cater to the wealthy, act on the belief that
fostering political polarization will work to their advantage, disregard
informal conventions that ease the interactions of competing centers of
governmental power, or seek short-term partisan advantage at the
expense of long-term systemic values and stability. So too when
regulatory bodies are captured by those they are meant to regulate, and
courts make it difficult for disfavored groups or individuals to vindicate
their rights. Similarly problematic is the lack of a quality educational
system committed to providing everyone—regardless of race or
economic status—with an appropriate foundation for citizenship and for
personal growth and success; a shortage of free, unbiased, and credible
news sources; and the absence of an independent judiciary committed to
ensuring the integrity of the electoral process. Such circumstances breed
fear, envy, loathing, exclusion, condescension, indifference, despair, and
cynicism. These are not the virtues needed for representative democracy;
and they will, in the end, either bring it down or so hollow it out as to
make it unrecognizable.32
This Essay, which could not possibly address all of the subjects
identified in the preceding paragraph, will begin by briefly considering
the recent history of representative or constitutional33 democracy
elsewhere in the world. The second section will explore in greater detail
what we mean to say when we talk about the concept of constitutional
democracy.34 The Essay will then consider three of the ways in which the

31. See Taylor Telford, Income Inequality in America Is the Highest it’s Been Since Census
Bureau Started Tracking It, Data Shows, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/09/26/income-inequality-america-highest-itsbeen-since-census-started-tracking-it-data-show/ [https://perma.cc/V3D7-UCLP] (describing how
income inequality is at its highest since the data first began to be tracked more than fifty years ago,
despite national unemployment and poverty rates being “at historic lows”).
32. See generally NADIA URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED: OPINION, TRUTH, AND THE
PEOPLE (2014); Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959).
33. See infra note 42 (explaining, among other things, the meanings of “constitutional” and
“representative” democracy, and noting that the two terms will be used interchangeably in this
Essay).
34. At first blush, the problems that the United States faces today may not seem to be as dire or
as existentially significant as those that face some other nations. On the other hand, some aspects
of our Constitution (the adoption of which marked the beginning rather than the maturation of
representative democracy) may make our system especially susceptible to current challenges. It
would be irresponsible not to treat those challenges as indicative of work that needs to be done.
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current governmental and political system may frustrate the practice of
constitutional democracy in the United States today.
First, many Americans hold an unrealistic or idealized view of our
democracy that prevents us from comprehending the full significance of
the anti-democratic features of our constitutional system and the
contribution that those features make to the problem of alienation and
voicelessness. That lack of understanding handicaps efforts to preserve
and strengthen our representative democracy.
Second, our idealized view of American democracy prevents us from
acknowledging that one aspect of our constitutional tradition is a
historical preference for defining our political community in terms that
are exclusionary, rather than inclusive. That, in turn, prevents us from
recognizing the strong influence that this exclusionary preference
continues to exert on substantial parts of our political community. It also
makes us slow to understand that we must resist the attractions of
exclusion (which tempt both sides of the current political divide) if we
are to promote the sense of common purpose that is essential to the
practice of constitutional democracy.
Third, the minimum requirements of constitutional democracy require
public confidence in the fairness of the electoral system, but the ordinary
political process cannot always ensure the existence of the conditions
essential to such fairness. Politicians control the electoral machinery, and
they are naturally interested in maintaining that machinery in a way that
works for them, rather than for the people. Moreover, when problems
arise in that respect, structural constraints make it unlikely, if not virtually
impossible, that the people will be able to remedy those problems without
involving the courts. But the courts have now largely abdicated their
responsibility for ensuring the fairness of the electoral process.
That story begins with the Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in
Colegrove v. Green.35 In Colegrove, the Court refused to entertain a
challenge to the Illinois congressional map, which made the votes in some
districts worth nine times the value of those cast in other districts. The
Court reasoned that the case involved a political question and that judicial
intervention would disrespect the democratic process.36 In later cases, the
Court took a different view, namely, that such judicial interventions are
both permissible and necessary. The Court recognized that neither the
people nor the political branches of government have both the will and
the capacity to ensure the integrity of the electoral process. More recently,
however, the Court has again disclaimed the power to act against most
manipulations and distortions of the electoral process. But constitutional
35. See generally Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
36. Id. at 556.
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democracy cannot remain viable when the people lack confidence in the
integrity of the electoral process as well as the means for doing anything
about it. Simply put, constitutional democracy cannot exist, let alone
thrive, in the Wild West—where politics knows no law, and anything
goes.
I. THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
Just twenty years ago, at the turn of the twenty-first century, the form
of government variously (and loosely) described as constitutional,
deliberative, liberal, or representative democracy appeared ascendant
throughout most of the world.37 Indeed, with the dissolution of the Soviet
Union,38 the emancipation of the former Warsaw Pact nations,39 and the
defeat of the apartheid regime in South Africa,40 this form of government
not only appeared to have triumphed decisively over its competitors, it
also seemed to have gained almost universal recognition as the form of
government best suited to the conditions and aspirations of the
contemporary world. To be sure, constitutional democracy had
experienced some rough patches in the late twentieth century, not least of
all in the United States, where the Vietnam War, the aborted War on
Poverty, the stubborn persistence of racial prejudice and economic

37. Although the terms are closely related, it bears emphasizing that they are not strictly
synonymous and necessarily bear different meanings depending on the specific modifier. For
example, the meaning of “liberal democracy” is related specifically to the primacy that “liberalism”
affords to individual liberty, and the danger that all government poses to that value. A key concept
of liberalism, as John Rawls has written, is that, “[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive system of equal basic liberty compatible with a similar system for all.” JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 220 (rev. ed. 1999). Similarly, the term “representative democracy” tends to
place emphasis on the “representative” nature of government, and, perhaps, on the translation of
democratic impulse into law and policy through the mediating process of representation. On the
other hand, “representation is [itself] an open-ended concept that is able to accommodate a wide
range of political visions, [significantly] including long- as well as short-term political thinking.”
MÓNICA BRITO VIEIRA & DAVID RUNCIMAN, REPRESENTATION 183 (2008). “Constitutional
democracy” is associated with the existence of a written or unwritten constitution that necessarily
constricts the power of government, whether that power rests entirely with the people or is
delegated to their representatives. Because direct or pure democracy is not practically possible on
anything but the smallest scale, and all governments today at least purport to be governed by
constitutions of one form or another, the terms “constitutional democracy” and “representative
democracy” will be used interchangeably in this Essay.
38. See generally WILLIAM TAUBMAN, GORBACHEV: HIS LIFE AND TIMES 500–650 (2017);
WISŁA SURASKA, HOW THE SOVIET UNION DISAPPEARED: AN ESSAY ON THE CAUSES OF
DISSOLUTION (1998).
39. See generally TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, THE POLISH REVOLUTION: SOLIDARITY (3d ed.
2002); TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, THE MAGIC LANTERN: THE REVOLUTION OF ‘89 WITNESSED IN
WARSAW, BUDAPEST, BERLIN, AND PRAGUE (1990).
40. See generally ROBIN RENWICK, THE END OF APARTHEID: DIARY OF A REVOLUTION (2015);
AFTER APARTHEID: REINVENTING SOUTH AFRICA? (Ian Shapiro & Kahreen Tebeau eds., 2011).
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inequality, the Watergate scandal, economic stagnation, and the energy
crisis, among other things, seriously eroded public confidence in the
competence, trustworthiness, and responsiveness of government.41 But
the problems experienced by the world’s oldest constitutional democracy
seemingly did little to chill enthusiasm for that form of government, let
alone suggest the possibility of any viable alternative. As other systems
of government collapsed in the final years of the twentieth century, the
constitutional democracies at least persisted, whatever their deficiencies
or challenges might have been.42 Indeed, the spirit and promise of
constitutional democracy inspired and energized many people throughout
the world.
The enthusiasm for constitutional democracy that moved the world in
the final years of the twentieth century is not much in evidence today.
Indeed, just as constitutional democracy seemed unequivocally
triumphant in most of the world at the turn of the century, 43 it is equally
clear that that form of government is in retreat throughout the world

41. See, e.g., Simon Hall, Protest Movements in the 1970s: The Long 1960s, 43 J. CONTEMP.
HIST. 655, 656–70 (2008) (discussing events in the 1960s and 1970s). Of course, Congress had
responded to some of these challenges, enacting legislation such as the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, the Ethics in Government Act, 92 Stat. 1824, and the War Powers Resolution,
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548. In addition, to the extent that environmental pollution and workplace
hazards had emerged as important public concerns, the government was able to take meaningful
first steps towards addressing them. See Paul Sabin, Environmental Law and the End of the New
Deal Order, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 965, 968–75 (2015) (discussing the development of public
interest environmental law); James J. Lawler & William M. Parle, Expansion of the Public Trust
Doctrine in Environmental Law: An Examination of Judicial Policy Making by State Courts, 70
SOC. SCI. Q. 134, 138–42 (1989) (discussing the public trust doctrine).
42. It is tempting to suggest that, like Winston Churchill, these framers of new governments
perceived that, “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that
have been tried.” Winston Churchill on Democracy (Nov. 11, 1947), in CHURCHILL BY HIMSELF:
THE DEFINITIVE COLLECTION OF QUOTATIONS 573 (Richard M. Langworth ed., 2008). But any
such observation would be unfaithful to the spirit of enthusiasm and optimism that prevailed at that
time. Timothy Garton Ash recently wrote that, “The West’s mistake after 1989 was not that we
celebrated what happened in Berlin, Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest as a triumph of liberal,
European, and Western values. It was all of that. Our mistake was to imagine that this was now the
norm, the new normal, the way history was going. . . . Thirty years on, we can see that, far from
being the new normal, what happened in Europe in 1989 was a great historical exception, unique,
one of a kind.” Timothy Garton Ash, Time For a New Liberation?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 24,
2019), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/10/24/time-for-new-liberation/ [https://perma.cc/
77D9-UR2W].
43. Perhaps the most notable exception was China, where a pro-democracy movement was
dramatically crushed in 1989. See, e.g., Marc Tracy, In China, a Reuters Partner Blocks Articles
on the Tiananmen Square Massacre, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
06/04/business/media/china-tiananmen-square-reuters-censored.html
[https://perma.cc/3UU4JKQG] (discussing Chinese government’s suppression of information about pro-democracy
demonstrations in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in anticipation of the thirtieth anniversary of the
demonstrations).
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today.44 That has been the case since at least the time of the Great
Recession of 2008, when the effects of the United States government’s
lax regulation of the financial sector reverberated throughout the world.45
Many forces undoubtedly were at work, but, for many, constitutional
democracy seemed no match for unbridled capitalism.
The retreat from constitutional or representative democracy takes
many forms. In the most extreme case, it appears as an absolute rejection,
not only of representative democracy, but of politics itself. Politics is
about compromise in the face of uncertainty and disagreement.46 But
compromise seems neither necessary nor desirable to those who deny the
possibility of factual uncertainty or the legitimacy of normative
disagreement. Compromise also lacks traction when the benefits seem
too little, the costs seem too great, and sometimes when the matters in
dispute simply seem too remote and unrelated to the challenges of one’s
own life.
The more specific rejection of representative democracy comes in
various forms, ranging from total rejection in some countries (both by
those who think that this form of government affords too much power to
the people—or freedom to the individual—and by those who think it
affords them too little) to its radical deformation or more subtle hollowing
out in others.47 Some citizens may be understandably frustrated with
44. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently observed that, “The liberal idea has become
obsolete. It has come into conflict with the interests of the overwhelming majority of the
population.” Lionel Barber, Henry Foy & Alex Barker, Vladimir Putin Says Liberalism has
‘Become Obsolete’, FIN. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/670039ec-98f3-11e99573-ee5cbb98ed36 [https://perma.cc/6F7V-KYLV]. One critic has suggested that the problem is
modernity itself. See PANKAJ MISHRA, AGE OF ANGER: A HISTORY OF THE PRESENT 338–39
(2017) (“Human beings had been freed, in theory, from the stasis of tradition to deploy their skills,
move around freely, choose their occupation, and sell to and buy from whomever they chose. But
most people have found the notions of individualism and social mobility to be unrealizable in
practice. . . . Enmeshed in its various dense networks, including an electronic web mediating his
relationship with reality, the individual can act satisfactorily neither upon himself nor upon the
world, and is reminded frequently and humiliatingly of his limited everyday consciousness and
meagre individual power.”). Others have written incisively about the various dimensions of this
problem as it manifests itself nationally, regionally, or more or less globally. See generally
WOJCIECH SADURSKI, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN (2019) (discussing the decline
of constitutional democracy in Central Europe); Maciej Bernatt & Michał Ziółkowski, Statutory
Anti-Constitutionalism, 28 WASH. INT’L. L.J. 487 (2019) (same).
45. See STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE
FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW, at xi (2013) (discussing the causal factors and global effects of
bank failures during the great recession).
46. See, e.g., Sandrine Baume, What Place Should Compromise Be Given in Democracy? A
Reflection on Hans Kelsen’s Contribution, 27 NÉGOCIATIONS 73 (2017) (discussing possible
justifications for compromise in democracies).
47. Timothy Garton Ash has suggested that,
[o]nly in Hungary . . . has the erosion of democracy gone so far that it is difficult to
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governmental processes that seem too slow and incapable of getting
anything done, while others may object more radically to the interposition
of any obstacle that delays or qualifies the translation into law and
government policy of what they take to be the majority will. 48 When
Amazon Prime can satisfy consumer choices almost instantaneously, why
should that not also be the case with political choices? When individuals
can express their feelings to millions of people with a couple of
keystrokes, why is it that government cannot—or will not—give
immediate effect to those feelings?49 What, after all, is the value of
reflection, discussion, or deliberation?
envision even the best-organized opposition party winning a national election anytime
soon. Everywhere else in the region there are still regular, free, and relatively fair
elections. As in America, as in Britain, as in every other imperfect democracy—and
which is not imperfect?—the challenge throughout Central Europe is to find the party,
the program, and the leaders to win that next election. They have our problems now.
Ash, supra note 42. In October 2019, however, the opposition party in Hungary managed to prevail
in many local elections, notwithstanding the ruling party’s control of the media. See, e.g., Benjamin
Novak, Setback for Orban as Opposition in Hungary Gains Ground in Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/europe/hungary-elections-orban.html
[https://perma.cc/88S6-HUYA] (“Overcoming the governing party’s nearly complete domination
of the news media and the state, opposition candidates won control in 11 of Hungary’s 23 larger
cities, including the capital, Budapest, compared with three in municipal elections five years ago.
They also put another dent in what had seemed a few years ago to be the inexorable march in parts
of Europe toward Mr. Orban's ‘illiberal’ and harshly anti-immigrant politics.”). In Poland, by
contrast, the Law and Justice party has solidified its electoral position by combining authoritarian
policies with generous social programs. See Marc Santora, In Poland, Nationalism with a
Progressive Touch Wins Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
10/10/world/europe/poland-election-law-and-justice-party.html
[https://perma.cc/JK6U-727L]
(“As Poles vote again this Sunday, that social welfare model lies at the heart of the success of Law
and Justice. . . . Outside Poland, Law and Justice has earned harsh criticism for asserting control
over the judiciary in ways some fellow European Union members say is anti-democratic, and for
its antipathy toward immigration and environmental policies. . . . But within Poland, the party has
succeeded not merely by playing to the conservatism of its rural and small-town base, but also by
attempting to redistribute wealth, so far without the budget-busting giveaways that often
accompany populism.”). But see John Henley, Election Results Give Hope to Opposition in Poland
and Hungary, GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/14/
election-results-opposition-poland-hungary [https://perma.cc/2BVS-WHWY] (“A narrower-thanexpected win for Poland’s ruling Law and Justice party (PiS) and a serious setback for Hungary’s
governing Fidesz show eastern Europe’s illiberal nationalist parties are not entirely invincible,
analysts and commentators have said.”).
48. See, e.g., ROGER EATWELL & MATTHEW GOODWIN, NATIONAL POPULISM: THE REVOLT
AGAINST LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, at xi (2018) (“Some national-populist leaders . . . speak of
creating a new form of ‘illiberal democracy’ that raises worrying issues about democratic rights
and the demonization of immigrants. However, most national-populist voters want more
democracy—more referendums and more empathetic and listening politicians that give more power
to the people and less power to economic and political elites. This ‘direct’ conception of democracy
differs from the ‘liberal’ one that has flourished across the West following the defeat of fascism
and which . . . has gradually become more elitist in character.”).
49. As Maureen Dowd pointed out in a recent column, “Congress is not a place where you
achieve radical progress—certainly not in divided government. It’s a place where you work at it
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Others lack trust, often with good cause, in the competence and
integrity of specific leaders or institutions.50 They suspect that their
leaders may be more responsive to people and entities who contribute
large sums to their campaign chests than they are to those they are meant
to represent.51 Some profess not to know whom or what to believe, while
the cynicism of others extends to virtually all leaders, news sources, and
“expert knowledge.”52
The decline of faith in constitutional democracy may be linked to
different factors in different countries, but there are some common
complaints. It seems clear, for example, that a constitutional democracy
cannot exist indefinitely—let alone flourish—when a substantial number
of citizens lack trust or confidence in government. The same is true when
citizens suspect that the government is being administered corruptly for
the benefit of the few, believe that their interests are not being taken
seriously, feel that they are not being treated as equal members of the
political community, or judge that their voices are not being heard by
those who are obliged to act for the benefit of all.

and work at it and don’t get everything you want.” Maureen Dowd, Scaling Wokeback Mountain,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/opinion/sunday/scalingwokeback-mountain.html [https://perma.cc/E2YN-GZ72].
50. See, e.g., JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, WHY LEADERS LIE: THE TRUTH ABOUT LYING IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 8 (2011) (“[T]he incentives to cheat and lie that apply when states are
dealing with each other usually do not apply to individuals within a state. Indeed, a strong case can
be made that widespread lying threatens the inner life of a state.”).
51. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 470 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003)) (“Corporate ‘domination’
of electioneering can generate the impression that corporations dominate our democracy. When
citizens . . . hear only corporate electioneering, they may lose faith in their capacity, as citizens, to
influence public policy. A Government captured by corporate interests, they may come to believe,
will be neither responsive to their needs nor willing to give their views a fair hearing. The
predictable result is cynicism and disenchantment: an increased perception that large spenders ‘call
the tune’ and a reduced ‘willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.’”). See also
Paul D. Jorgensen, Geoboo Song & Michael D. Jones, Public Support for Campaign Finance
Reform: The Role of Policy Narratives, Cultural Predispositions, and Political Knowledge in
Collective Policy Preference Formation, 99 SOC. SCI. Q. 216, 229 (2018) (“It is possible, if not
probable, the public has more knowledge of our campaign finance system than recognized
previously, and we expect this specific knowledge to influence the persuasiveness of elite appeals
and collective preference formation. For now, it is enough to argue that the continued use of wellcrafted narratives, along with skyrocketing campaign spending numbers from a small subset of our
society, and the agenda setting efforts of politicians will likely increase support for reform.”).
52. See, e.g., TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST
ESTABLISHED KNOWLEDGE AND WHY IT MATTERS (2017) (discussing dismissal of technical
expertise). See also Barry Sullivan & Christine Kexel Chabot, The Science of Administrative
Change, 52 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3335558
[https://perma.cc/N5US-EBMW] (discussing relationship of expert knowledge and political will in
federal administrative law).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
What do we mean by “constitutional democracy”? At the outset, it is
important to recognize that the term “constitutional democracy” is not
just another word for democracy. In a pure democracy, the people rule
directly and without external constraints.53 In a constitutional democracy,
by contrast, both the people themselves and their representatives are
typically bound by at least some laws that they cannot alter at will.54 As
James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 51, “the great difficulty lies in
this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and
in the next place, oblige it to control itself.”55 One problem with
constitutional democracy is that it joins together two separate (and at least
53. In Federalist No. 10, Madison defined “pure democracy” as one in which the people rule
directly:
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure Democracy, by which I
mean, a Society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer
the Government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common
passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a
communication and concert results from the form of Government itself; and there is
nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious
individual. Hence it is, that such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence
and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights
of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in
their deaths.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 56, 61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Who counts as
part of “the people,” or what qualifications exist for inclusion in “the people,” is an important
threshold question for both direct and representative democracy. See infra notes 76, 88 and
accompanying text.
54. Even in the United Kingdom, where the legislative branch is theoretically supreme,
parliament must conform to certain constitutional documents and principles that constrain its
lawmaking authority. See, e.g., T.R.S. Allan, Questions of Legality and Legitimacy: Form and
Substance in British Constitutionalism, 9 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 155 (2011) (discussing British
constitutionalism); John Baker, The Unwritten Constitution of the United Kingdom, 15
ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 4, 12–27 (2013) (same). In most cases, as a practical matter, the people and
their representatives will not only be subject to fundamental laws that cannot be altered at will, they
also will be subject to the authority of tribunals with some degree of authority to interpret and
enforce those fundamental laws. For example, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom recently
declined to legitimize the executive’s prorogation of parliament. See R. (On the Application of
Miller) v. The Prime Minister, [2019] UKSC 41 at ¶ 61 (Sept. 24, 2019) (“It is impossible for us to
conclude, on the evidence which has been put before us, that there was any reason—let alone a
good reason—to advise Her Majesty to prorogue Parliament for five weeks . . . . We cannot
speculate, in the absence of further evidence, upon what such reasons might have been.”). Of
course, much theoretical and political controversy has attended the normative question as to what
degree of authority or deference such tribunals should be afforded in a democratic society. See
generally SADURSKI, supra note 44; STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS
JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004);
JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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partially antagonistic) concepts—constitutionalism and democracy.
Walter F. Murphy has explained that “[c]onstitutional democracy . . .
unites beliefs that, although the people’s freely chosen representatives
should govern, those officials must respect certain substantive limitations
on their authority. Like most marriages, this one constantly suffers from
flawed management and flawed human nature but also from tensions
between the two theories.”56
Professor Murphy has further explained:
Democracy offers one means to permit a people to live in safety and
enjoy both liberty and justice. The people shall rule. As both governors
and governed, they will advance the common good without oppressing
themselves—or so the argument goes. Constitutionalists, however,
believe that “the people” . . . are more likely to form a congeries of
different groups and thus, in a majoritarian political system, are likely
to be ruled by a coalition of potentially self-serving minorities.
Constitutionalists are distrustful of “majority’s” benevolence toward
those who are “different” from or compete against them. Lest a majority
of any sort shrink “the public good” into what is good for its own
members, constitutionalists offer another option: accept the necessity of
government to advance and protect the welfare of society, support
popular government, but install institutional checks on the authority of
all rulers, even the people themselves.57

In essence, these two theories of government—democratic theory and
constitutionalism—reflect markedly different worldviews. “For
democratic theory, what makes governmental decisions morally binding
is process: the people’s freely choosing representatives, those
representatives’ debating and enacting policy and later standing for
reelection, and administrators’ enforcing that policy.” 58 Democratic
theory also prizes popular participation because it gives expression to
individual autonomy and deters government violations of individual
rights.59 By contrast, “[c]onstitutionalists tend to be more pessimistic
about human nature, fearing that people are sufficiently clever to oppress
[others] without hurting themselves.”60 “They are constantly concerned

56. WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING A
JUST SOCIAL ORDER 10 (2007).
57. Id. at 1–2.
58. Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 3, 4
(Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 5.
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with the human penchant to act selfishly and abuse power” and think that
institutional and cultural checks are insufficient to protect liberty.61
Notwithstanding these conceptual contradictions, constitutional
democracy has long been viewed as providing the basis for an
appropriately balanced government, one in which the people do not rule
directly, but through their representatives; and all are constrained by
law.62 As a practical matter, of course, these two elements—
constitutionalism and democracy—may be blended or balanced in
various ways.63 The design of some constitutional democracies may grant
more prominence to elements associated with constitutionalism, while
others may tilt in favor of democratic elements. In some constitutional
democracies, for example, the constitution particularly emphasizes the
value of citizen participation in government and may even authorize
citizen-initiated referenda, initiatives, and similar devices, which grant
citizens some degree of direct power to make binding law themselves,
without the need for intermediary action by their representatives.64 At the
61. Id. at 6.
62. See, e.g., Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and
the People’s Elusive “Right to Know”, 72 MD. L. REV. 1, 32 (2012) (“A pure democracy was
thought [by the framers] to be theoretically undesirable as well as practically impossible.”).
63. Thus, as Aileen Kavanagh has written:
[F]or democratic government to exist, there must at least be an electoral mechanism in
place which allows citizens to influence the choice of legislation by participating
periodically in the choice of legislators. No system which debars citizens from playing
a part in the decision-making process can be deemed democratic, and no conception of
democracy that excludes such a role is tenable. But the exact kind or degree of
participation that is desirable, is subject to debate. It is not axiomatic given the value of
participation. Since there are a variety of institutional arrangements which could satisfy
the participatory requirement of democracy to a greater or lesser degree, the chosen one
must bear a burden of justification.
Aileen Kavanagh, Participation and Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy Waldron, 22 LAW & PHIL.
451, 455 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
64. See, e.g., PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA’S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA’S
FUTURE (1998); THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1989); Uwe Wagschal, Direct Democracy and Public Policymaking,
17 J. PUB. POL’Y 223, 225–41 (2008) (discussing the impact of practices of direct democracy, such
as referenda, on public policymaking); Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy:
New Approaches to Old Questions, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 463 (2004). See also CAROLE PATEMAN,
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1 (1970) (“It is rather ironical that the idea of
participation should have become so popular, particularly with students, for among political
theorists and political sociologists the widely accepted theory of democracy (so widely accepted
that one might call it the orthodox doctrine) is one in which the concept of participation has only
the most minimal role. Indeed, not only has it a minimal role but a prominent feature of recent
theories of democracy is the emphasis placed on the dangers inherent in wide popular participation
in politics.”). Professor Pateman stands strongly against this “orthodoxy.”
When the problem of participation and its role in democratic theory is placed in a wider
context than that provided by the contemporary theory of democracy, and the relevant
empirical material is related to the theoretical issues, it becomes clear that neither the
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other end of the democratic spectrum are constitutional democracies in
which the role of citizens is more narrowly conceived, even being limited
“to obey[ing] law and perhaps, in periodic elections, to confirm[ing] the
choice of leaders whose election gives them the power to enact into law
whatever policies they see fit.”65 In either case, the fundamental fairness
and integrity of the electoral process is a central, indispensable, nonnegotiable feature of constitutional democracy. Without it, constitutional
democracy is a farce and a fraud.
In most of its contemporary variations, the practice of constitutional
democracy requires hard work on the part of citizens, and it carries no
certain guarantee of advantageous policy outcomes.66 Of course, a
demands for more participation, nor the theory of participatory democracy itself, are
based, as is so frequently claimed, on dangerous illusions or on an outmoded and
unrealistic theoretical foundation. We can still have a modern, viable theory of
democracy which retains the notion of participation at its heart.
Id. at 111. Even referenda that are not meant to produce legally binding results may be given that
effect for political rather than legal reasons. See Todd L. Ely, Government by Advice: Public
Participation and Policymaking Through Advisory Ballot Measures, 47 ST. & LOC. GOV. REV. 92,
94–97 (2015). For example, the so-called Brexit referendum was not binding on the government as
a matter of law. David Allen Green, Can the United Kingdom Government Legally Disregard a
Vote for Brexit?, FIN. TIMES (June 14, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/5b82031e-1056-31e18e0e-4e91774e27f1 [https://perma.cc/8YZQ-RV5Z] (“The UK government could seek to ignore
such a vote; to explain it away and characterise it in terms that it has no credibility or binding effect
(low turnout may be such an excuse). Or could they say it is now a matter for parliament, and then
endeavor to win the parliamentary vote. Or ministers could try to re-negotiate another deal and put
that to another referendum.”). But, successive prime ministers have chosen to treat it as if it were.
See, e.g., EU Referendum Outcome: PM Statement, GOV.UK (June 24, 2016),
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-referendum-outcome-pm-statement-24-june-2016
[https://perma.cc/7VSP-QP6V] (“The British people have voted to leave the European Union and
their will must be respected. . . . We must now prepare for a negotiation with the European
Union. . . . Now the decision has been made to leave, we need to find the best way . . . .”).
65. See ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW’S COMMUNITY: LEGAL THEORY IN SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 149 (1995) (describing Max Weber’s view of bureaucratic citizenship). An
interesting and recently controversial feature of English parliamentary democracy is the procedure
whereby the party in power chooses a new party leader (who automatically assumes the position of
prime minister) when the incumbent prime minister steps down from party leadership between
elections. See, e.g., Ceylan Yeginsu, U.K. Voters’ Frustration High as 99% Are Sidelined in Prime
Minister Election, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/20/
world/europe/uk-prime-minister-vote.html [https://perma.cc/445Y-6WWJ] (“‘The future of our
country is going to be decided by a handful of out-of-touch toffs,’ said Chris Richardson, 21 . . . .
‘[T]he public is desperate to have its say, but instead we are being shut out further and are forced
to watch this slow-motion car crash.’”). When this last occurred, the new party leader (who lacked
a clear majority in the House of Commons) called for new parliamentary elections several months
after becoming party leader and was rewarded with an overwhelming majority. See Mark Landler
& Stephen Castle, Conservatives Win Commanding Majority in U.K. Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/12/world/europe/uk-election-boris-johnson.html
[https://perma.cc/PU9E-EF4V].
66. See, e.g., NADIA URBINATI, DEMOCRACY DISFIGURED: OPINION, TRUTH, AND THE PEOPLE
20–21 (2014) (“Good outcomes, if and when they occur, are a reward for procedures, not what
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constitutional democracy will not continue to exist indefinitely—and it
certainly will not flourish—if it repeatedly makes bad decisions. Citizens
will lose faith in their government and external foes will likely seize
whatever advantage the incompetence of their adversaries affords. But
the success of a constitutional democracy ultimately depends at least as
much on the processes it employs to reach its decisions as on the quality
of the decisions it makes.67 For both reasons, however, it is critical that
gives their normative value. . . . [O]ur contemporary societies . . . are democratic because they have
free elections and the opportunity to have more than one political party competing, because they
allow effective political competition and debate among diverse and competing views, and finally
because elections make the elected an object of control and scrutiny.”). In any event, social
psychologists and others have long recognized that a more inclusive decisional process generally
produces better outcomes. See, e.g., Michael Kaufman, Social Justice and the American Law
School Today: Since We Are Made for Love, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1187, 1222 (2017) (“Diverse
individuals in a group create a higher level of collective intelligence than groups comprised of even
higher achieving individuals.”); Kristin Johnson, Steven A. Ramirez & Cary Martin Shelby,
Diversifying to Mitigate Risk: Can Dodd-Frank Section 342 Help Stabilize the Financial Sector?,
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795, 1806–07 (2016) (footnotes omitted) (“[G]roupthink, herd behavior,
and affinity bias challenge group decision-making. Similarly humans naturally fall prey to
confirmation bias, overconfidence, and structural bias. . . . Evidence suggests that these tendencies
can be mitigated through enhanced cultural diversity.”); Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the
Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85, 99 (2000) (footnotes omitted) (“Heterogeneous working
groups offer more creative solutions to problems than homogeneous working groups. They also
show greater inclination for critical thinking and are likely to avoid problems associated with ‘group
think,’ where members mindlessly conform to group precepts.”).
67. Democratic governments must also be judged on the quality of their decisions and rule, as
Aileen Kavanagh has argued:
But does the intrinsic importance of participation give it the special status that Waldron
claims? Would a political system which fully guaranteed the right to participate, but was
otherwise unjust, be justified? I believe that the answer to this question is negative. The
reason for this is that the intrinsic value of participation does not compromise the central
importance of what Joseph Raz calls the “instrumentalist condition of good
government.”
....
. . . Some political decisions involve a choice between states of affairs or actions which
are morally right or wrong, better or worse, independently of what people prefer.
....
. . . In the case of these decisions . . . our preferences can be evaluated on the basis of the
preferred state of affairs and political decisions of this sort can be assessed in light of the
morality of the states of affairs they establish or actions they authorize. The fact that
decisions are taken ‘democratically’ does not preclude, or at least should not preclude,
such evaluation.
....
. . . Governments can have the authority to do that which they ought not to do. But it is
not part of the reason for any government’s authority that it should pass unjust or
immoral laws. The reason for their authority is that they will rule well.
Kavanagh, supra note 63, at 460–61, 463. As Justice Jackson observed in Youngstown, the framers
intended to “diffuse[] power . . . to secure liberty,” but they also contemplated that “practice will
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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citizens be well educated, informed, and engaged.68 They must have
access to accurate and relevant information and the freedom to hear and
to speak.69 They must feel a certain minimal degree of trust and respect,
both for their representatives and for each other.70 Above all, they must
care enough about government—and think that government, and what
government does or fails to do, is sufficiently important and
consequential—to warrant investing the time and resources necessary to
monitor their representatives’ activities.71
68. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those
who won our independence believed . . . that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; . . . that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government.”). See also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 102–03 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he protection of public discussion . . . takes on an everincreasing importance as the nation succeeds in so educating and informing its people that, in mind
and will, they are able to think and act as self-governing citizens.”).
69. See Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,
14 (1976) (“The public, as sovereign, must have all information available in order to instruct its
servants, the government.”). In our time, government continues to hold back information without
any legitimate justification, and the ability of the people to monitor their elected officials is thereby
diminished. See, e.g., MARY GRAHAM, PRESIDENTS’ SECRETS: THE USE AND ABUSE OF HIDDEN
POWER (2017) (discussing government secrecy and transparency); FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR.,
DEMOCRACY IN THE DARK: THE SEDUCTION OF GOVERNMENT SECRECY (2015) (same); DANIEL
PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1998) (same). However, an equally
serious threat stems from technological advances that have created both a multiplicity of
information sources and an overabundance of information (much of which may be unreliable), and
from market forces that threaten the sustainability of traditional, relatively neutral, and reliable
news outlets. See, e.g., S. Mo Jang & Joon K. Kim, Third Person Effects of Fake News: Fake News
Regulation and Media Literacy Interventions, 80 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 295, 295–302 (2018)
(discussing the threat of fake news and how to respond to alleviate its effects). Although these
developments obviously pose a serious threat to the practice of constitutional democracy, the
government has done little to address them, as demonstrated by Congress’s dilatoriness in
addressing Russian efforts to influence American elections. See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, Mitch
McConnell, Too, Welcomes Russian Interference, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/13/opinion/mitch-mcconnell-russian-interference.html
[https://perma.cc/T2P3-XECZ] (discussing Senator Mitch McConnell apparent unwillingness to
engage the problem of protecting United States elections from outside interference).
70. See, e.g., Matt Stevens, Falling Trust in Government Makes it Harder to Solve Problems,
Americans Say, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/us/politics/
pew-trust-distrust-survey.html?searchResultPosition=3 [https://perma.cc/WT6R-EGPP] (“[T]he
deep skepticism is not reserved solely for politicians, according to the survey: Almost two-thirds
of respondents said they thought trust in each other had declined, too. . . . More than 90 percent . . .
thought it was important to improve the level of confidence Americans have in government and in
each other. And more than 80 percent thought [it] . . . was possible.”).
71. In 1792, Madison wrote that, “[t]o secure all the advantages of [a federal republic], every
good citizen will be at once a centinel over the rights of the people; over the authorities of the
confederal government; and over both the rights and the authorities of the intermediate
governments.” James Madison, Government, in THE LIBRARY OF AMERICA, JAMES MADISON:
WRITINGS 501, 502 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). Richard Brookhiser has argued that Washington
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In a world filled with distractions in almost endless variety, however,
citizens may conjure a multitude of excuses for failing to do what real
citizenship requires. In this and other ways, constitutional democracy
imposes duties on citizens, and it often requires them to make sacrifices
for the common good or the general welfare. As Danielle Allen has
observed: “The hard truth of democracy is that some citizens are always
giving things up for others. Only vigorous forms of citizenship can give
a polity the resources to deal with the inevitable problem of sacrifice.” 72
There must be a mechanism for justly allocating those burdens. In
addition, however, citizens must be well disposed toward the polity to be
willing to make such sacrifices, when called upon to do so. In other
words, citizens in a democracy must believe that their “ownership” of
government is real, and that those who control the government are
committed to acting, not for the special benefit of their families, friends,
or campaign contributors, but for the benefit of all.73 If citizens feel
and Hamilton “thought the people should rule when they voted, then let the victors do their best
until the next election,” but that “Madison now believed in more than popular choice. He wanted
the people to be consulted continually. They would be his partners in government.” RICHARD
BROOKHISER, JAMES MADISON 106–07 (2011).
72. DANIELLE S. ALLEN, TALKING TO STRANGERS: ANXIETIES OF CITIZENSHIP SINCE BROWN
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 29 (2004). Professor Allen continues: “[O]ne of the achievements of the
protagonist of [Ralph] Ellison’s novel, Invisible Man, is to develop criteria for distinguishing
legitimate from illegitimate forms of sacrifice, and also to outline a form of citizenship that helps
citizens generate trust enough among themselves to manage sacrifice.” Id.
73. According to David Goldfield, a large part of the population was justified in entertaining
something like that belief during the Great Depression and World War II and for about twenty years
after the war:
What I call the commonwealth ideal defined governance in the United States during the
first two decades after World War II. The ideal followed three basic principles of
governance. First, government should enhance opportunities for all Americans. . . .
Second, the ideal charged government with the responsibility of balancing competing
interests—individuals, business and industry, and government itself—to benefit the
nation. Third, the commonwealth ideal required obedience to the rule of law. . . .
....
The ideal worked best when citizens believed that the government kept their interests
paramount. That was the case during the Great Depression and World War II. Once those
crises ended, maintaining the commonwealth ideal became more difficult. Yet, for a
remarkable twenty-year period following the war, the federal government did just that.
DAVID GOLDFIELD, THE GIFTED GENERATION: WHEN GOVERNMENT WAS GOOD 1 (2017). As
Professor Goldfield readily concedes, however, not everyone would have been justified in holding
that belief in 1945:
Despite [today’s] growing economic and social inequality, America today is better off
than it was in 1945. Better off for women, for African Americans, for gays, and for all
who share in the belief that expanding freedom for one expands freedom for all. What is
missing today and has been for at least three decades is a good federal government
ensuring opportunity for the greatest number as opposed to the relatively few.
Id. at 447. See also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 27, at xii–xiv (“Racial segregation in housing was not
merely a project of southerners in the former slaveholding Confederacy. It was a nationwide project
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alienated from their government and each other, they will not be disposed
to make the sacrifices that democratic government frequently requires.
Permutations of constitutional democracy necessarily blend the two
elements—constitutionalism and democracy—in differing ratios. Some
now reasonably question whether the particular blend of
constitutionalism and democracy embodied in our constitutional text and
practice strikes the proper balance for our times and circumstances.
III. THE “ANTI-DEMOCRATIC” ASPECTS OF OUR CONSTITUTION AND THE
PROBLEM OF VOICELESSNESS
The United States is often called the world’s oldest democracy, but that
is something of a misnomer. The Constitution of 1787 antedates the great
developments in representative democracy of the nineteenth century, 74
and it must be understood in that context. The Founders thought that a
democratic government would be impracticable in so vast a territory as
that which encompassed the thirteen original states, but they also thought
that democracy was not normatively desirable in any event.75 In the
Founders’ view, the point of constitutional government was not to
translate the majority’s unmediated desires immediately into law and
policy, but to promote wise laws and government policies that would
further the long-term needs and interests of the nation.76 That was not
of the federal government in the twentieth century, designed and implemented by its most liberal
leaders. . . . [S]cores of racially explicit laws, regulations, and government practices combined to
create a nationwide system of urban ghetto surrounded by white suburbs. Private discrimination
also played a role, but it would have been considerably less effective had it not been embraced and
reinforced by government. . . . [R]acially explicit government policies to segregate our metropolitan
areas are not vestiges, were neither subtle nor intangible, and were sufficiently controlling to
construct the de jure segregation that is now with us in neighborhoods and hence in schools.”).
74. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (2d
ed. 1861) (discussing theory of representative democracy).
75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 53, at 56, 61–65.
76. Id. Certainly, the Founders had no intention of creating a popular or democratic government
as we understand the term. See infra note 92 (describing John Adams’s views on suffrage). Even
the authors of England’s Great Reform Bill of 1832 had no such intention. See ANTONIA FRASER,
PERILOUS QUESTION: REFORM OR REVOLUTION? BRITAIN ON THE BRINK, 1832, at 41 (2013) (“Yet
it should be stressed that the idea of the rule of the people as such—what is now known as
democracy—was anathema in [Britain in] the early nineteenth century.”). “Indeed, the very word
‘democracy’ caused a shudder at this juncture while the phrase ‘the people’ implied, generally
speaking, a mob and not a very friendly mob at that.” Id. At the time the Great Reform Bill of 1832
was being considered, “Sir Herbert Taylor, King William’s influential private secretary, would
confide to [the Prime Minister, Lord] Grey that his master ‘dreaded the Democracy [his capital
letter] towards which he conceived the institutions of the country to be gradually approaching.’”
Id. (footnote omitted). The King, who also opposed the Secret Ballot and Universal Suffrage, “even
wondered whether the whole movement for Reform [of the ‘rotten boroughs’] was not ‘a specious
cloak for the introduction of Republicanism.’” Id. at 71. See also SHILLIAM, supra note 17, at 1
(Even in the late nineteenth century, “Parliament’s sovereignty was ill-disposed towards the
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likely to be accomplished, the Founders thought, if a majority of qualified
voters (themselves a small and limited group) could make their will felt
too immediately or too directly. The majority’s policy preferences were
likely to be too concerned with short-term interests, too susceptible to the
influence of fickle fashion, and too indifferent to long-term gains. It was
therefore necessary to design structures that would allow for deliberation
as well as action and allow popular views to be tested and refined.
Numerous provisions of the Constitution were aimed at distancing the
government from the immediate control of the people. For example, the
president and vice president were not to be chosen directly by a majority
vote of the people. Instead, the qualified voters in each state would choose
a group of “wise men” who would form the “electoral college,” the
members of which would assemble in their respective states and cast their
votes for president.77 The candidate who garnered the greatest number of
electoral votes would become the president, while the runner-up would
become the vice president.78 The president was given a four-year term
sentiments of the ‘people’ entering the halls of Westminster in an unmediated fashion. Rather, the
people’s representatives had to exercise independent reason in deliberation and decision making.
For right or wrong, parliamentary sovereignty has always demanded representative rather than
direct democracy.”).
77. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The electors shall meet in their respective states, and
vote by ballot . . . .”). Scholars have also shown that the creation of the electoral college was
intimately connected to slavery and the relative numbers of free whites in the north and south. See,
e.g., Juan F. Perea, Echoes of Slavery II: How Slavery’s Legacy Distorts Democracy, 51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1087–91 (2018) (discussing that one purpose of the electoral college was to
protect the political interests of slave owners in presidential elections); Paul Finkelman, The
Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1145 (2002). As A.V. Dicey
noted long ago, the convention soon arose that the electors would vote as directed by those who
chose them, rather than exercising independent discretion, as the founders contemplated. See A.V.
DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 28–29 (8th ed. 1915)
(“Constitutional understandings have entirely changed the position of the Presidential electors.
They were by the founders of the constitution intended to be what their name denotes, the persons
who chose or selected the President; the chief officer, in short, of the Republic was, according to
the law, to be appointed under a system of double election. The intention has failed; the ‘electors’
have become a mere means of voting for a particular candidate; they are no more than so many
ballots cast for the Republican or the Democratic nominee.”). Litigation recently resulted from the
fact that several electors voted in the 2016 presidential election for candidates other than those to
whom they were pledged. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019), cert.
granted sub nom., Colo. Dep't of State v. Baca, No. 19-518, 2020 WL 254162 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020);
Matter of Guerra, 193 Wash. 2d 380, 393, 441 P.3d 807, 813 (2019), cert. granted sub nom.,
Chiafalo v. Washington, No. 19-465, 2020 WL 254167 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020); see also Trip Gabriel,
Electoral College Members Can Defy Voters’ Wishes, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/us/politics/electoral-college-faithless-elector.html
[https://perma.cc/4UZC-GEDP] (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s decision in which the court held
that Colorado had acted improperly in replacing elector who voted for a candidate other than the
candidate who won the popular vote).
78. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The person having the greatest number of votes shall be
the President . . . . In every case, after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest
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and could be removed only by impeachment. In addition, the Framers
sketched out the executive branch, the presidential office, and the precise
nature of the president’s relationship to the executive branch in only the
most general terms, leaving the precise scope of the president’s
constitutional powers uncertain.79 One recent president has characterized
the presidential office as having “all the power of Louis XIV, only for
four years at a time.”80
The Constitution established the Supreme Court, but otherwise left to
Congress the design of the judicial branch, subject to the requirement that
judges be appointed by the president, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and that they “shall hold their offices during good behavior.”81
Similarly, the Framers divided the legislative power between the state and
federal governments, and they further divided the federal legislative
power between the House of Representatives and the Senate.82 In
addition, the members of the Senate were not to be elected directly by the

number of votes of the electors shall be the Vice President.”). Almost immediately, this method of
selecting the president proved unworkable, and the Constitution was amended to provide that
presidential and vice-presidential candidates would stand for election as a team. Id. amend. XII. If
there is a tie in the electoral college, the House of Representatives will decide the election. Id. The
House of Representatives decided the election of 1824. After the Electoral College deadlocked, the
House selected John Quincy Adams, despite Andrew Jackson’s having apparently garnered a larger
percentage of the popular vote. See generally DONALD RATCLIFFE, THE ONE-PARTY
PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST: ADAMS, JACKSON, AND 1824’S FIVE-HORSE RACE (2015). Apart from
the election of 1824, there have been four other presidential elections (1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016)
in which one of the candidates gained the presidency without winning a majority of the popular
vote. See Jonathan R. Cervas & Bernard Grofman, Why Noncompetitive States Are so Important
for Understanding the Outcomes of Competitive Elections: The Electoral College 1868–2016, 173
PUB. CHOICE 251, 254–60 (2017) (discussing empirical analyses that show likely Electoral College
outcomes).
79. CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HUISTORY 28, 88, 98 (1923) (discussing the relative absence of appropriate
models at the state level, the importance of the New York and Massachusetts precedents, and the
development of thinking about the length of the president’s term); Gbemende Johnson, Executive
Power and Judicial Deference: Judicial Decision Making on Executive Power Challenges in the
American States, 68 POL. RES. Q. 128, 132–36 (2015) (discussing empirical analyses of judicial
deference to executive decisions).
80. In United States v. Nixon, 416 U.S. 683 (1974), President Nixon apparently instructed his
lawyer to argue that the president is not amenable to judicial process because he “is as powerful a
monarch as Louis XIV, only for four years at a time, and is not subject to the processes of any court
in the land except the court of impeachment.” TIM WEINER, ONE MAN AGAINST THE WORLD: THE
TRAGEDY OF RICHARD NIXON 337 n.94 (2015).
81. Johnson, supra note 79, at 134–36 (suggesting that judges are responsive to the threat of
executive branch retaliation when ruling on cases about executive power).
82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consists of a Senate and House of Representatives.”);
id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
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people of each state, but by the members of each state’s legislature.83 To
further ensure their independence from the people, the Constitution
provided for six-year terms for Senators, and only one-third of the Senate
would be elected every two years.84 Only the members of the House of
Representatives, who were given two-year terms, were to be elected
directly by the people—or, more accurately, by that part of the people
who qualified as voters.85
A critical fact about representative government in the United States,
therefore, is the extent to which it sought from the beginning to restrain
rather than give immediate or unmediated effect to the majority’s will.
That is neither surprising nor shocking because the Constitution that
launched our government was based on a particular “science of
government”—one that especially valued deliberative judgment and
sought to protect minority rights.86 In addition, the Constitution was
adopted before the emergence of modern democratic government, and, in
some ways, it has been adapting to the new reality and demands of
democracy ever since.87 At the same time, the Founders intended to
create a representative government—one that would be capable, not only

83. See id. art. I, § 3 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof . . . .”). The Seventeenth Amendment, which was
adopted in 1913, provides for the direct election of senators. Id. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people
thereof . . . .”).
84. See id. art. I, § 3 (describing the term length and manner in which Senators were to be
elected).
85. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (describing the manner in which members of the House are to be
elected).
86. The new science of politics also recognized the inevitability of conflict and the need for
conflict to be managed. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 53, at 58–60 (discussing the
factions and their management). See also David Wootton, Introduction, in THE ESSENTIAL
FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS xxix–xxxviii (David Wootton ed., 2003) (discussing
the new “science of politics”); MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 19–20 (1987) (discussing David Hume’s influence on the “science of politics”).
87. The Constitution has been amended several times to bring it more into line with democratic
theory. As noted, Senators were originally chosen by the state legislatures, but became subject to
popular election in 1913. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (describing senatorial term length and the
manner of their election). In addition, the franchise has been expanded several times to prohibit the
withholding of the right to vote on various specific grounds. See id. amend. XV (race, color, or
previous condition of servitude); id. amend. XIX (sex); id. amend. XXIII (residence in District of
Columbia); id. amend. XXIV (poll tax); id. amend. XXVI (age). On the other hand, the Constitution
has not been amended to authorize instruments of direct democracy, such as referenda, initiatives,
and the recall of elected officials—something that some state constitutions contemplate. See, e.g.,
CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8–15 (providing for processes of direct democracy such as referenda and
initiatives).
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of making wise decisions for the benefit of all, but of properly
representing “the people” and being accountable to them.88
But a major source of popular discontent with government today is the
perception that government is too far removed from the people, that it is
too unresponsive to the will of the people, and that the constitutional
safeguards properly designed to prevent hasty or ill-conceived
governmental action have, in practice, led to legislative paralysis, the
aggrandizement of the executive, and a governmental system that is
attentive and responsive mainly to the interests and desires of the rich and
powerful. In other words, the same mechanisms that may be effective in
protecting against hasty decisions or ill-conceived policies may also serve
to distance the people from the government—and the government from
the people. Many now believe, correctly or not, that the government of
the United States is a government of the elite, by the elite, and for the
elite.
IV. “THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES”
Any modern definition of representative democracy would necessarily
begin with the principle of universal suffrage.89 The political community
includes all citizens, and all citizens have equal rights, including the right
to an equal vote. In that sense, modern representative democracy is
naturally inclusive. Consistent with their time and purpose, however, the
Founders did not perceive universal suffrage to be a central or even a
necessary element of the government they were designing. 90 Indeed,
88. In this sense, David Epstein is correct when he emphasizes “The Federalist’s repeated and
very emphatic insistence on a ‘strictly republican’ or ‘wholly popular’ form of government,” one
in which “all officials [are] to be directly or indirectly elected by the people.” DAVID F. EPSTEIN,
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 5 (1984) (footnotes omitted). From the viewpoint of
democratic theory, however, it is necessary to interrogate more closely the notion of “indirectly”
elected officials, and, more fundamentally, the meaning of “the people.” As Robert Dahl has
observed, the question who can participate in the political process is “a curiously neglected and yet
absolutely crucial problem,” because, if democracy means “in some sense ‘rule by the people,’” it
is essential that we know who can participate in that rule by casting his or her ballot. See ROBERT
DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION?: AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY 59 (1970).
89. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 78 (2d ed. 1998) (“Let me now put it this
way: Full inclusion. The citizen body in a democratically governed state must include all persons
subject to the laws of that state except transients and persons proved to be incapable of caring for
themselves.”).
90. See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (2000) (“Perhaps owing to the absence of some of the
revolution’s most democratic leaders (including Jefferson, Paine, Samuel Adams, and Patrick
Henry), there was no formal debate [at the Constitutional Convention] about the possibility of a
national standard more inclusive than the laws already prevailing in the states.”). “By 1790 . . .
roughly 60 to 70 percent of adult white men (and very few others) could vote.” Id. at 24 (footnote
omitted). Relatively speaking, white adult males enjoyed broad access to the franchise in the

2019]

Democratic Conditions

583

rather than have the Constitution set forth any specific criteria for
granting the right to vote, the Founders left to the state governments the
task of setting qualifications for voting, even with respect to federal

American states:
The lengthy colonial and post-independence experience provided a sturdy foundation for
the efforts that Americans now undertook in the next phase of the revolution, when the
new republic was transformed into a more democratic republic. To be sure, at the end of
the eighteenth century few Americans were ready to concede that the principles of the
Declaration, much less democratic citizenship, applied to everyone. . . .
Yet always keeping in mind the huge and persistent exceptions, by the standards
prevailing elsewhere in the world the extent of equality among Americans was
extraordinary.
ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 22–23 (2d ed. 2003);
see also CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760–
1860, at 19 (1960) (noting that confining the vote in colonial elections to those who were “free,
white, twenty-one, native-born Protestant males who were the owners of real property, appeared to
be the best guarantee of the stability of the commonwealth”). Robert J. Steinfeld has shown that
the situation with respect to voting in the early Republic was considerably more complicated than
most commentators have appreciated, and that the move towards universal suffrage was far from
linear. See Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 336 (1989). One overriding concern was the possibility of corruption that was thought to exist
when persons who were not independent or self-governing were granted the franchise. In the early
Republic, that concern was not abandoned, but the definition of self-governing or independent
shifted to include those who were self-sufficient wage-earners as well as those who owned property.
Professor Steinfeld writes:
On the one hand, republican principles continued to have an impact on the terms of the
franchise, but only in modified form. The republican precept that only the self-governing
should exercise political authority, for example, was not abandoned. Rather, it was recast
to make use of the liberal idea that the self-governing were those who owned and
disposed of themselves. The republican notion that propertylessness and lack of
autonomy go hand in hand also continued to shape franchise qualifications. It persisted
in the idea that property in one’s labor distinguished the independent from the dependent.
....
On the other hand, this nineteenth century regime of political rights can hardly be called
purely liberal. Voting rights were not completely separated from social or economic
status. They were divorced from property ownership, but taxpaying qualifications
continued the tradition of imposing pecuniary restrictions on the franchise. . . . The tale
of suffrage reform in the early American republic thus is not a story of one coherent
historical formation replacing another—republican giving way to liberal—but a story of
the ad hoc way in which contradictory cultural materials were cobbled together under
pressure to produce a new accommodation.
Id. at 375. Interestingly, some of those who opposed the Fifteenth Amendment made a similar
argument, suggesting that the newly emancipated slaves were not truly independent or selfgoverning and that they might simply vote in accord with their former masters’ directions. ERIC
FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE
CONSTITUTION 58 (2019). The same objection was made to certain immigrants. See MATTHEW
FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE 17 (Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed. 1999) (1998) (“[R]epublicanism would
favor or exclude certain peoples on the basis of their ‘fitness for self-government,’ as the phrase
went, and some questionable peoples would win inclusion based upon an alchemic reaction
attending Euro-American contact with peoples of color.”).
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elections. Thus, the Constitution simply provides that voters in federal
elections “in each State must have the Qualifications requisite for
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”91 In
1787, the states generally restricted the franchise to white male propertyowners, and the Constitution did nothing to change that.92 In practical
terms, therefore, the Constitution of 1787 essentially ratified the
exclusionary choices of the states. In that sense, the Constitution was not
an inclusive or “democratic” document, and it set the stage for countless
battles to be fought over who should be entitled to share in the kind of
full participation in the political community that the right to vote has
come to represent.93 Only slowly, and often against unyielding
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. In other words, if the state finds someone qualified to vote in
elections for “the most numerous branch” of the state legislature, the state cannot exclude that
person from voting in federal elections. In addition, the Constitution further provides that the state
legislatures shall have primary responsibility for determining “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” but with the important qualification that
“Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing [sic] Senators.” Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. By contrast, the Founders were determined “to deny
either branch of Congress the authority to add to or otherwise vary the membership qualifications
[for Senators and Congresspersons] expressly set forth in the Constitution.” Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 532 (1969).
92. Among other things, for example, the Convention did not act favorably on Abigail Adams’s
earlier plea that the Continental Congress “remember the ladies.” See Letter from Abigail Adams
to John Adams (March 31, 1776), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 518 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (asking that women be given a voice and be treated more equitably than
in the past). Indeed, John Adams was unalterably opposed to any suggestion that the qualifications
for voting should be liberalized. In a May 1776 letter to James Sullivan, a Massachusetts official
who favored expansion of the franchise, Adams wrote that,
Depend upon it, sir, it is dangerous to open So fruitful a Source of Controversy and
Altercation, as would be opened by attempting to alter the Qualifications of Voters.
There will be no End of it. New Claims will arise. Women will demand a Vote. Lads
from 12 to 21 will think their Rights not enough attended to, and every Man, who has
not a Farthing, will demand an equal Voice with any other in all Acts of State. It tends
to confound and destroy all Distinctions, and prostrate all Ranks, to one common Levell.
Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION,
supra, at 394, 395–96. In addition, there were approximately 58,000 free people of color in the
United States. Terry Bouton, Chart: Slave, Free Black, and Slave Populations, 1780–1830,
https://userpages.umbc.edu/~bouton/History407/SlaveStats.htm.
[https://perma.cc/MD7QQZYZ]. Whether they had the right to vote was also a matter of state law. See MICHAEL A. SMITH,
KEVIN R. ANDERSON & CHAPMAN RACKAWAY, STATE VOTING LAWS IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL
STATUTES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 26–41 (2015) (explaining that the right to vote was statedependent and not automatic despite one’s classification as a citizen).
93. According to Eric Foner, on the eve of the Civil War, “black men enjoyed the same right to
vote as their white counterparts in only five of the thirty-four states, all in New England.” FONER,
supra note 90, at 5. In addition, “[t]he adoption of a weaker version [of the Fifteenth Amendment],
restricted to eliminating racial barriers to voting, stemmed not from a limited commitment to black
rights but to opposition to equality for others, especially immigrants from China and Ireland, and
the conviction that a ‘simple and direct’ amendment was most likely to win ratification.” Id. at 105.
Nonetheless, according to Wendell Phillips, Rhode Island hesitated to ratify because of the
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opposition, has representative government in the United States become
more inclusive over the past two centuries, and that increased inclusivity
has sometimes been more theoretical than real.94 As amendments to the
Constitution progressively precluded the states from formally
disenfranchising certain categories of people, states and localities often
continued to find ways to do so as a practical matter.95
As Barbara Young Welke has suggested, “Questions of belonging rest
at the heart of the modern liberal democratic state.”96 The Constitution
possibility that “race” might be construed to include the Irish. Id. at 108.
94. See, e.g., Barry Sullivan, Three Tiers, Exceedingly Persuasive Justifications and Undue
Burdens: Searching for the Golden Mean in US Constitutional Law, 20 EUR. J.L. REFORM 181,
216–29 (2018) (discussing limitations on voting rights).
95. See Atiba R. Ellis, The Meme of Voter Fraud, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 881, 893–94 (2014)
(discussing waves of new practical limitations on voting rights that repeatedly followed theoretical
expansions of the franchise).
96. BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, LAW AND THE BORDERS OF BELONGING IN THE LONG
NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 1 (2010). Professor Welke continues:
But what does belonging mean? Who belongs? Does belonging depend on there being
others who do not belong? What is their relationship to the polity? Does it matter what
the basis for belonging is, what the defining characteristics of belonging are? Who
decides? What does law have to do with it? The answers to these questions are critical
in establishing who can make claims on the polity and who cannot; on relationships
among those who live in the polity; and in making a population a people. They highlight,
what I call, “borders of belonging.” Though borders of belonging have been fundamental
to the human condition throughout history, they are of particular significance in the
modern world and especially to the modern liberal democratic state with its assumptions
of the sovereign individual, universal equality, and the authority of the rule of law.
Id. From the beginning, and throughout “America’s long nineteenth century,” Professor Welke
argues, the concept of personhood, and thus of citizenship and the nation, was that of the able, white
male, and “[t]he mobilization of law in defense of the able white male republic fostered a culture
of identity politics that would define the twentieth century.” Id. at 141. According to Professor
Welke, “Part of the value of borders of belonging as a conceptual tool is its power to expose
instances in which belonging for some is achieved through the subordination or exclusion of
others.” Id. at 5. “However much we may want to believe in the progressive narrative of personhood
and citizenship that has long been a part of America’s national myth, it is hard to deny the work of
privilege and subjection—borders of belonging—in the building and work of the modern American
state.” Id. at 152. More generally, Michael Hanchard posits a “first-order relationship between
democracy and political inequality.” HANCHARD, supra note 28, at 14. Professor Hanchard writes:
While most students of contemporary and ancient democratic experiments have focused
on an ethos of democracy, [my] concern here is to explore the ethnos of ancient and
contemporary democracies, the manner in which the practice of a democratic politics, in
most instances, has combined inclusionary and exclusionary regimes and value
judgments regarding the prospects of citizenship for differentiated populations.
Id. According to Professor Hanchard, “What makes democratic politics unique is not the absence
of political inequality, but the dynamic interaction between democratic and antidemocratic politics
in the same polity—the systematic accrual of political privileges among certain groups at the
expense of other less privileged groups.” Id. at 74. See also NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH
BECAME WHITE 79 (1995) (“White supremacy was not a flaw in American democracy but part of
its definition, and the development of democracy in the Jacksonian period cannot be understood
without reference to white supremacy.”).
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purports to speak on behalf of “the people of the United States.”97 But
who are “the people of the United States”? The text of the Constitution
does not define who “the people” are. Presumably, they are members of
the political community, but in what way? And what relationship does
membership in the political community have to voting? Clearly, the
Founders’ definition of “the people” or “the political community” must
have included white women and children, but they were not generally
entitled to vote, so it must have included at least some individuals who
lacked the right to vote.98 It may be instructive in this respect to recall
that two separate constitutional amendments—the Fourteenth and the
Fifteenth Amendments—were required to grant citizenship and the right
to vote to those who were emancipated by the Thirteenth Amendment.
As Eric Foner has suggested, “putting birthright citizenship into [the
Fourteenth Amendment] represented a dramatic repudiation of the
powerful tradition of equating citizenship with whiteness, a doctrine built
into the naturalization process from the outset and constitutionalized by
the Supreme Court in Dred Scott.”99 But the Fifteenth Amendment was
97. William Treanor has recently pointed out that the Convention’s Committee of Style
significantly altered the language of the draft initially approved by the Convention, which purported
to speak on behalf of “[w]e the People of the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, RhodeIsland and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia,” so that the Preamble now
purports to speak on behalf of “[w]e the people of the United States.” William M. Treanor,
Framer’s Intent: Gouverneur Morris, the Committee of Style, and the Creation of the Federal
Constitution 78 (Scholarship @ Georgetown, Working Paper, Feb. 5, 2019), available at
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2163 [https://perma.cc/ZG9X-L3YW]. As Dean
Treanor notes, “[t]he changes in the Preamble reframed the document, converting it from a
document establishing a confederation without overarching purpose, to a document creating a
nation animated by powerful goals.” Id.
98. See WELKE, supra note 96, at 69–70 (“The border of belonging was never just a matter of
the distinction between those who could claim citizenship and those who could not. White women
and disabled persons, male and female, were citizens from the beginning of the new republic. . . .
Yet none of these groups enjoyed full membership in the nation.”). “With each successive
expansion of suffrage—first to white men and then to African American men—the link between
suffrage and citizenship became more fully established; the inequity of the denial of suffrage to
women became increasingly hard to bear.” Id. at 101. Chief Justice Waite discussed the relationship
of citizenship and suffrage in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875). In that case, the Court
unanimously rejected a Missouri woman’s argument that she was entitled to vote, holding that
United States citizenship had never carried the right to vote with it, that the right to vote could not
therefore be a right that was protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that state constitutions and laws that “commit that important trust to men alone
are not necessarily void.” Id. at 178. More generally, Eric Foner has observed that, “[s]lavery
shaped the definition of citizenship before the Civil War, giving it a powerful racial dimension. A
nation, in Benedict Anderson’s celebrated phrase, is more than a political entity—it is ‘an imagined
political community,’ whose borders are as much intellectual as geographic. Slavery rendered
blacks all but invisible to those imagining the American community.” FONER, supra note 90, at 2–
3.
99. FONER, supra note 90, at 71. That tradition dated back to the earliest days of the republic.
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required to prohibit the denial of the right to vote “on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.”100 In any event, the text of the
Constitution does not itself define who “the people” are. Even today we
seem to struggle over who is included in the “political community” and
what is meant by “the people of the United States.”101
In Federalist No. 1, Alexander Hamilton emphasized what he deemed
to be the singular importance of the nascent American experiment in selfgovernment. Hamilton observed that the people of the United States had
been granted an unprecedented opportunity to try their collective hand at
designing a new form of government for themselves, along logical and
scientific lines, and without the oversight or interference of any superior
power.102 The opportunity was great, and so too were the stakes. If the
“[T]he nation’s first Naturalization Law, passed in 1790, limiting naturalization to ‘free, white
persons,’ and the steadfast resistance to anything more than the symbolic amendment of the law in
the wake of the American Civil War, testified to the assumption that the United States was in fact
and was determined to remain a white nation.” WELKE, supra note 96, at 35. So was the Federal
Militia Act of 1792, which limited service in the militia to “free able-bodied white male citizens of
the respective states.” Id. With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment, Professor Foner further notes
that,
[t]he last-minute addition of a definition of American citizenship constitutionalized the
principle that virtually every person born in the country is a citizen, regardless of the
race, national origin, or the political affiliation or legal status of one’s parents. . . .
. . . [B]irthright citizenship . . . remains an eloquent statement about the nature of
American society, a powerful force for assimilation of the children of immigrants, and a
repudiation of a long history of racism.
Id. See also MARTHA S. JONES, BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENS: A HISTORY OF RACE AND RIGHTS IN
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 12 (2018) (“Citizenship had a piecemeal quality in antebellum America,
defined only as needed. . . . White women and children were said to be citizens, though most agreed
that their rights should be determined as much by age or sex as by their status. Paupers, the infirm,
the feeble, and the insane represented a litany of conditions that functioned to compromise access
to rights for those otherwise deemed citizens. From time to time, free people of color even held in
hand affirmations of their citizenship.”).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. Some supported placing a guarantee of universal manhood
suffrage in the Fourteenth Amendment, but that failed. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 90, at 80–92.
101. Jordon B. Barkalow, Changing Patterns of Obligation and the Emergence of Individualism
in American Political Thought, 57 POL. RES. Q. 491, 492–93 (2004). See also SHILLIAM, supra
note 17, at 1–2 (2018) (noting the Brexit supporters’ rhetorical reliance on “the will of the people,”
notwithstanding the closeness of the vote, and asking “who is morally worthy to count as ‘the
people’”).
102. Hamilton wrote that,
It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this
country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether
societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from
reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political
constitutions, on accident and force.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 3 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Hamilton further
noted that,
If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, at which we are arrived may with propriety
be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the
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people of the United States were successful in this project, the benefits
would flow to all humankind. If, on the other hand, the people of the
United States were not successful in this venture, their failure would be
the misfortune of all. It is a sobering thought, of course, and one that well
sets the stage, both for The Federalist’s further account of the new
science of politics and for our understanding of the relevance of the
American project to those that followed.
At the outset, however, a question naturally arises. Montesquieu,
whose work was admired by the founding generation, thought that “the
government most conformable to nature is that which best agrees with
the humour and disposition of the people in whose favour it is
established,” and that, for that reason, it would “be a great chance [or
fortuity] if [the laws] of one nation suit another.”103 Who, then, were “the
people” upon whom this singularly important responsibility was to fall?
Who were “the people” of the United States?
Although Hamilton says a great deal by way of introduction in
Federalist No. 1, he makes no effort to define “the people of the United
States,” describe their composition, or identify the criteria for
membership in that body in any detail.104 As noted, the question is also
part we shall act, may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune
of mankind.
Id. In more recent times, many additional “societies of men [and women]” have been afforded the
opportunity to prove that “good government” can be established “from reflection and choice,”
rather than by “accident and force.” And it has fallen to those societies also to prove that such a
government can be rooted in the concept of deliberative or constitutional democracy. That was
particularly the case in the years following the Second World and the emancipation of former
European colonies, and once again in the years that followed the break-up of the former Soviet
Union and the emancipation of the former Warsaw Pact nations. See, e.g., Heinz Klug, Model and
Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the “Rise of World Constitutionalism”, 2000 WIS.
L. REV. 597 (discussing the place of the United States Constitution in the context of global
constitutionalism).
103. MONTESQUIEU, 1 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS ch.3 (David Wallace Carrithers ed., 1977). In
a similar vein, Justice Joseph Story attributed John Locke’s lack of success in drafting a constitution
for the Carolinas to his ignorance of the manners and customs of the people who lived there:
Perhaps in the annals of the world there is not to be found a more wholesome lesson of
the utter folly of all efforts to establish forms of governments upon mere theory; and of
the dangers of legislation without consulting the habits, manners, feelings, and opinions
of the people upon which they are to operate.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 58 (abr. ed.
1833).
104. Hamilton does mention some of “the people,” namely those whose interests constitute
some of the “most formidable . . . obstacles” to the adoption of the Constitution, namely,
[A] certain class of men in every State [who] resist all changes which may hazard a
diminution of the power, emolument and consequence of the offices they hold under the
State-establishments—and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will
either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter
themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into
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left open by the text of the Constitution, which purports to speak on behalf
of “We, the people of the United States,”105 but does not formally define
the term.106 John Jay makes a valiant effort to fill the gap in Federalist
No. 2, but his effort is, if anything, less satisfying than Hamilton’s silence.
In Federalist No. 2, Jay first discusses the geographical circumstances
that he deems auspicious with respect to the successful accomplishment
of this bold experiment in government-making, specifically mentioning
the contiguity of the territory of the United States, the fertility of the land,
the variety of soils and production, the abundance of water resources, and,
finally, the large number of navigable waterways suitable for
commerce.107
According to Jay, the United States was well-suited to the challenge of
designing a new form of government for a second reason, namely, the
homogeneity of its people. In that regard, Jay writes:
With equal pleasure, I have as often taken notice that Providence has
been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—
a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same

several partial confederacies, than from its union under one government.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 102, at 4.
105. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
106. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 318, 403 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall had occasion
to consider the process whereby the people had ratified the Constitution, but he had no occasion to
consider how membership in “the people” was conferred. See id.
The convention which framed the constitution was indeed elected by the state
legislatures. But the instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal,
without obligation, or pretensions to it. It was reported to the then existing congress of
the United States, with a request that it might “be submitted to a convention of delegates,
chosen in each state by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its legislature,
for their assent and ratification.” This mode of proceeding was adopted; and by the
convention, by congress, and by the state legislatures, the instrument was submitted to
the people. They acted upon it in the only manner in which they can act safely,
effectively, and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in convention. It is true, they
assembled in their several states—and where else should they have assembled. No
political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which
separate the states, and of compounding the American people into one common mass.
Of consequence, when they act, they act in their states. But the measures they adopt do
not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the people themselves, or become the
measures of the state governments.
The question of membership in the political community was addressed in Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
393, 411 (1857) (“[The slave trade and fugitive slave] clauses in the Constitution point directly and
specifically to the negro race as a separate class of persons, and show clearly that they were not
regarded as a portion of the people or citizens of the Government then formed.”). See id. at 572–73
(Curtis, J., dissenting) (“At the time of the adoption of the Constitution . . . all free native-born
inhabitants of . . . New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina,
though descended from African slaves were not only citizens of those states, but such of them as
had the other necessary qualifications of electors, on equal terms with other citizens.”).
107. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 9 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles
of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by
their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side-by-side throughout
a long and bloody war, have nobly established liberty and
independence.108

Jay continues, noting that the people of the United States are united by
the strongest ties:
This country and this people seem to have been made for each other,
and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance
so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by
the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial,
jealous, and alien sovereignties.109

Finally, Jay asserts that these strong ties encompass “all orders and
denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have
uniformly been one people; each individual citizen everywhere enjoying
the same national rights, privileges, and protection.”110 Excluded
altogether from Jay’s description, of course, were approximately seven
hundred thousand people of African descent—a not insubstantial
omission, given that the total population of the United States was about
3.8 million at the time.111 Nor was the omission accidental. Most of those
108. Id. Interestingly, the Articles of Confederation had provided a special mechanism for
Canada to join the United States, which would have immediately produced a state of affairs
somewhat at odds with Jay’s description. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1871, art. XI
(“Canada acceding to this confederation, and joining in the measures of the united states, shall be
admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this union: but no other colony shall be admitted
into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine states.”). Later, with the conclusion of
the Mexican-American War and the ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, the
United States acquired a substantial number of Mexican-Americans who obviously were not
“descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion,
attached to the same principles of government, [or] very similar in their manners and customs . . . .”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, supra note 107, at 9. See also WELKE, supra note 96, at 70 (discussing
incorporation of Mexican-Americans).
109. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, supra note 108.
110. Id.
111. See generally U.S. DEP’T COMM., HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES,
COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, CHART: SLAVE, FREE BLACK, AND SLAVE POPULATIONS, 1780–1830
(Sept. 1975), available at https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/histstats-colonial-1970.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PA7A-3YEJ]. The 1790 census counted 694,207 slaves and 58,660 free persons
of color. Slaves accounted for approximately 36 percent of the total population, while free persons
of color accounted for approximately 3 percent. Id. See also Gordon S. Wood, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY:
A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 394–99 (2009) (noting that free people of
color were not assured of equal treatment). Different issues related to the situation of Native
Americans, both as members of sovereign tribes and as individuals. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §
2, cl. 3 (excluding from enumeration “Indians not taxed”). Angela R. Riley has noted that the Indian
tribes, which had been involved in many wars with the colonists, were seen as “military opponents,
not wholly unlike foreign powers,” and that they “were largely excluded from the foundational
processes that contributed to the country’s formation; they were not party to the Constitutional
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seven hundred thousand people were slaves, and even those who were
free did not generally enjoy “full equality before the law.”112 The extent
of their rights depended on the state in which they resided, but they were
not favorites of the law at either the state or federal level. When Congress
passed the first Naturalization Act in 1790, for example, it specifically
limited the possibility of acquiring citizenship through naturalization to
foreign-born “white persons.”113
The obvious point of Jay’s argument was to persuade his readers as to
both the feasibility and the need for a federal form of government and,
thus, the need to adopt the Constitution. He therefore emphasizes those
factors that counsel unity over those that might weigh in favor of the
several state sovereignties going their separate ways. But the people were
considerably less homogeneous than Jay’s account might suggest. The
people of the small states had interests separate and distinct from those
of the large states; those who lived by farming and husbandry had
interests different from those engaged in shipping and commerce; those
who farmed in the north had interests different from those who farmed in
the south; and the interests of creditors were directly opposed to those
who owed them money. And the nation was profoundly divided, not only
on the issue of slavery, but also according to wealth.114
A major theme of The Federalist, of course, was the capacity of the
federal system to attend to the problem of diverse interests and beliefs.
Madison recognized the inevitability of conflicting interests and opinions
Convention and were never formally brought within the federal framework.” Angela R. Riley,
Native Nations and the Constitution: An Inquiry into Extra-Constitutionality, 130 HARV. L.
REV. F. 173, 179–180 (2017). But Gregory Ablavsky notes that the executive’s efforts to clarify
the constitutional status of Native Americans “dominated early federal governance, particularly
[during] the Washington Administration . . . when the United States entered into major treaties and
land purchases with Native nations, fought a lengthy and costly Indian war, and sought to end
endemic cycles of frontier violence.” Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124
YALE L.J. 1012, 1018–19 (2015). Professor Ablavsky elsewhere notes that,
[U]sing Indians to justify the power of the new national state came with a cost: it elevated
conquest of Indians to a constitutional principle. Although few Federalists were rabid
Indian-haters of the sort common on the frontier, they had sold the Constitution by
promising to use federal power against Indians rather than, as Madison had anticipated,
to restrain states.
George Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1008 (2014) (footnote omitted).
Moreover, “The history of national violence against Indians that followed ratification fulfilled the
Hamiltonian vision, as the dispossession and settlement of western lands became one of the central
projects of the new federal state.” Id.
112. FONER, supra note 90, at 4. As Professor Foner notes, “[t]heir situation was anomalous—
one jurist referred to free blacks as ‘quasi-citizens.’” Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., SEAN CONDON, SHAYS’S REBELLION: AUTHORITY AND DISTRESS IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (2015); DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAY’S REBELLION: THE MAKING OF
AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION (1980).
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in Federalist No. 10, for example, and he argued in favor of the
Constitution on the ground that a republican federal government would
be more efficient in controlling the effects of such divisions.115 He made
the same argument at the Constitutional Convention, where he
emphasized class interests and differences based on wealth and poverty:
It ought finally to occur to a people deliberating on a Govt. for
themselves, that . . . the major interest might under sudden impulses be
tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In all civilized Countries
the people fall into different classes havg. [sic] a real or supposed
difference of interests. There will be creditors & debtors, farmers,
merchts. [sic] & manufacturers. There will be particularly the
distinction of rich & poor. It was true as had been observd. [sic] (by Mr.
Pinkney) we had not among us those hereditary distinctions, of rank
which were a great source of the contests in the ancient Govts. as well
as the modern States of Europe, nor those extremes of wealth or poverty
which characterize the latter. We cannot . . . be regarded . . . as one
homogeneous mass, in which everything that affects a part will affect
in the same manner the whole. In framing a system which we wish to
last for ages, we shd. [sic] not lose sight of the changes which ages will
produce. An increase of population will of necessity increase the
proportion of those who will labour [sic] under all the hardships of life,
& secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings. They may
in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of indigence.
According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the
hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been made in this
Country, but symptoms of a leveling spirit, as we have understood, have
sufficiently appeared in a certain quarters to give notice of the future
danger.116

Speaking soon after Madison had finished, Alexander Hamilton
likewise emphasized the persistence of economic inequality and the
divergent interests of rich and poor. He reportedly said that,
It was certainly true that nothing like an equality of property existed:
that an inequality would exist as long as liberty existed, and that it
would unavoidably result from that very liberty itself. This inequality

115. The Articles of Confederation had not succeeded in creating a workable frame of
government, let alone in resolving these differences. One aim of the founding generation was to
establish a workable government, notwithstanding these divisions, by creating a limited
government in which power would be diffused. See Keith Dougherty & Justin Moeller,
Constitutional Change and American Pivotal Politics, 40 AM. POL. RES. 1092, 1097–1102 (2012)
(analyzing the impact of size and power on governmental gridlock).
116. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 422–23 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1937) (detailing the proceedings of June 26, 1787).
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of property constituted the great & fundamental distinction in
Society.117

The extent to which Jay rests his argument on common descent and the
profound homogeneity of “the people” is telling. Presumably, Jay thought
that the degree of racial, religious, and cultural homogeneity that he
attributed to “the people,” together with the wealth of natural resources
that the new nation enjoyed, would provide a particularly solid basis on
which a “republican” form of government could be established and
prosper. That was Jay’s argument in Federalist No. 2. But he took a
somewhat more nuanced view in Chisholm v. Georgia,118 as H. Jefferson
Powell has suggested.119
In Chisholm, Chief Justice Jay held that Georgia could not invoke the
“feudal” principle of sovereign immunity because sovereignty had
117. Id. at 424. In a somewhat different vein, George Washington would later emphasize
another aspect of American diversity, namely, that of religion, as he did in his well-known letter of
August 18, 1790 to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island. See Letter from George
Washington to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport (Aug. 18, 1790), available at
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-06-02-0135
[https://perma.cc/M6J3KE7H] (“The Citizens of the United States of America have a right to applaud themselves for
having given to mankind examples of an enlarged and liberal policy: a policy worthy of imitation.
All possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship. It is now no more that
toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed
the exercise of their inherent natural rights. For happily the Government of the United States, which
gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance requires only that they who live under its
protection should demean themselves as good citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual
support.”). Madison was also mindful of factions founded on grounds other than economic interests.
In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, dated October 18, 1787, he wrote:
There will be rich and poor; creditors and debtors; a landed interest, a monied interest, a
manufacturing interest. These classes may again be subdivided according to the different
productions of different situations & soils, & according to different branches of
commerce, & of manufactures. In addition to these natural distinctions, artificial ones
will be founded, on accidental differences in political, religious or other opinions, or an
attachment to the persons of leading individuals. However erroneous or ridiculous these
grounds of dissention and faction may appear to the enlightened Statesman, . . . the bulk
of mankind . . . will continue to view them in a different light.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 18, 1787), in THE LIBRARY OF AMERICA,
supra note 71, at 142, 150. In his letter to Jefferson, which was written shortly before the publication
of Federalist No. 10, Madison also debunks the idea that a homogeneous society can be counted
on to alleviate the effects of faction:
Those who contend for a simple Democracy, or a pure republic, actuated by the sense of
the majority, and operating within narrow limits, assume or suppose a case which is
altogether fictitious. They found their reasoning on the idea, that the people composing
the Society, enjoy not only an equality of political rights, but that they all have precisely
the same interests, and the same feelings in every respect. . . . We know however that no
Society ever did or can consist of so homogeneous a mass of Citizens.
Id. at 149–50.
118. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 470–71 (1793).
119. H. Jefferson Powell, The United States as an Idea: Constitutional Reflections, 49 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 705, 711 (2018).
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“devolved on the people” at the time of the Revolution and no longer
resided in the government.120 Thus, according to Chief Justice Jay, the
people “are truly the sovereigns of the country, but . . . sovereigns without
subjects (unless the African slaves among us may be so called) and have
none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as
fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.” 121 Interestingly,
even in Chisholm, Chief Justice Jay did not quite know how to describe
the status of the “African slaves among us,” let alone that of the many
free people of color in the United States. But he obviously knew that those
he described as equal citizens and “joint tenants in the sovereignty” were
not all “descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language,
professing the same religion.”122
Professor Powell has observed that, for Jay, “the language of
‘sovereignty’ must be linked inextricably to a particular idea of
‘equality,’” that is, “the political dignity and moral claims of each
individual who belongs to the political community.”123 All citizens being
equal in terms of their civil rights, no citizen can be inferior to another,
and “[t]he purpose of government therefore lies in ‘the preservation
of . . . the equal sovereignty, and the equal right’ of each individual who
is part of the people.”124 Finally, Professor Powell observes that the
judgment in favor of Chisholm reflects Jay’s understanding of equality,
namely, that, “intrinsic to the very idea of the United States is this
political community’s promise . . . that each one’s claims matter, that no
one is beyond the protection of the nation’s institutions, that our compact
is to govern ourselves in such manner that we lose sight of no individual,
even in situations of public tension and concern.”125 When viewed from

120. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 471.
121. Id. at 471–72. Professor Powell specifically discusses the clause pertaining to “the African
slaves among us,” noting that Jay was “a leading member of the New York emancipation movement
and as governor signed into law the bill providing for the gradual abolition of slavery.” Powell,
supra note 119, at 713. Quoting Jay, Professor Powell writes:
“I wish to see all unjust and all unnecessary discriminations everywhere abolished,” Jay
once wrote, “and that the time may soon come when all our inhabitants of every color
and denomination shall be free and equal partakers of our political liberty.” But soon is
not now, and Jay recognized that race-based human chattel slavery made a mockery of
the idea of the United States as the “land of equal liberty,” where there should be no
inferiors. Unless and until ‘all [the] inhabitants’ of the United States are “free and equal”
in dignity and respect, on Jay’s understanding the nation betrays its own meaning by
giving way to the feudal notion that there are those among us who are not our equals.
Id.
122. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 472; THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay).
123. Powell, supra note 119, at 711.
124. Id. at 712.
125. Id. at 712.
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this perspective, the political community is necessarily inclusive and its
unity cannot be made to depend on the happenstance of ethnic, religious,
or cultural homogeneity. Its inclusivity derives directly from the
sovereignty of its members.
Jay ultimately looked forward to a time when “all our inhabitants of
every color and denomination shall be free and equal partakers of our
political liberty.”126 But Jay’s 1787 description of the United States
reflects a radically less inclusive understanding of what it means to be an
American—the kind of understanding that has provided inspiration over
the centuries to those who would make unwelcome whomever spoke a
different language, had different manners and customs, worshipped in a
different way, or simply looked different.127 In times of crisis, the nation
has often come together in exceptional demonstrations of common
purpose. At other times, however, it has failed to act in that spirit of
common purpose and respect for the common good that is the cornerstone
of a democratic society. The spirit of exclusion has always provided some
Americans with a rationale for disrespecting others. Over the course of
our history, people have been discriminated against—and sometimes
demonized—because of their race or ethnic identity, their poverty, their
disabilities and infirmities, their regional backgrounds, their cultures and
ways of speaking, their religion or lack of religious belief, their gender or
sexual orientations, and their status as immigrants.
V. AN EQUAL VOICE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
Finally, equal access to the franchise and public confidence in the
integrity of the electoral system are indispensable to the practice of
constitutional democracy, but the political process cannot always ensure
that confidence in the fairness of the electoral process will be justified.
Politicians are primarily responsible for maintaining our electoral
machinery, and their primary interest is not in the fairness of elections.

126. Id. at 713 (quoting Jake Sudderth, Jay and Slavery, THE PAPERS OF JOHN JAY (2002)
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/libraries/inside/dev/jay/JaySlavery.html
[https://perma.cc/N3EDRJNF]).
127. See generally ROBERT L. FLEEGLER, ELLIS ISLAND NATION: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND
AMERICAN IDENTITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2013) (discussing American immigration
policy in the twentieth century); KATIE OXX, THE NATIVIST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA: RELIGIOUS
CONFLICT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2013) (discussing anti-Catholic violence in nineteenth
century America); LIPING ZHU, THE ROAD TO CHINESE EXCLUSION: THE DENVER RIOT, 1880
ELECTION, AND RISE OF THE WEST (2013) (discussing the anti-Chinese movement in the West).
See also Jacey Fortin, ‘Huddled Masses’ in Statue of Liberty Poem Are Europeans, Trump Official
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/14/us/cuccinelli-statueliberty-poem.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/73KQ-XQ5N] (detailing the Trump
Administration official’s exclusionary interpretation of Lazarus poem on Statue of Liberty).
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What interests them the most is winning elections and gaining or
maintaining control of the machinery of government. In that regard,
politicians are mainly concerned with what works for them, and not
necessarily with what works for the people. At the same time, structural
constraints make it virtually impossible for the people to prevent electoral
unfairness without judicial intervention.128 In recent years, however, the
courts have not only abdicated that responsibility, they have affirmatively
assisted the politicians in their search for additional ways to manipulate
the electoral system. This strikes at the heart of constitutional democracy.
As previously noted, neither the Constitution of 1787 nor the Bill of
Rights specifically guarantees the right to vote in federal elections. From
the beginning, the right to vote in federal elections depended on having
the right to vote in state elections, and that remains the case today. 129 On
the other hand, the Constitution specifically prohibits the states from
denying the right to vote in federal elections to citizens who are qualified
to vote in elections for the most numerous branch of the state
legislature.130 In addition, several constitutional amendments have
limited the states’ power to discriminate against potential voters, at least
as a formal matter, on certain specific grounds: “on account of race, color,

128. See, e.g., Michael Wines, In the War Against Gerrymandering, An Army of Voters Meets
A Dug-in Foe, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/15/
us/gerrymandering-redistricting-wisconsin.html [https://perma.cc/VKQ7-BVUV] (discussing the
effects on currently gerrymandered districts of a recent Supreme Court decision); Elizabeth
Kolbert, Drawing the Line: How Redistricting Turned America From Blue to Red, NEW YORKER
(June 20, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/06/27/ratfcked-the-influence-ofredistricting?mbid=social_twitter [https://perma.cc/4NGA-PSZP] (discussing the effects of
gerrymandering).
129. The police power grants to state officials the power to determine the qualifications for
voting in state elections, and the constitutional text grants them the same power with respect to
federal elections. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he Electors [in federal elections] in each
State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature.”).
130. Id.
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or previous condition of servitude;”131 “on account of sex;”132 “by reason
of failure to pay any poll tax, or other tax;”133 and “on account of age”
for those “eighteen years of age or older.”134 Supreme Court
jurisprudence (particularly cases decided by the Warren Court) has
imposed further limitations on the states, including such requirements as
that which mandates that electoral districts be drawn in such a way as to
encompass populations of substantially the same size.135
The canonical account of this history takes the form of “a triumphant
narrative about voting and citizenship,” which emphasizes the
progressive legal expansion of the franchise over time.136 But “the
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibited state officials from using
“race, color, or previous condition of servitude” to exclude people from the franchise, but it did not
prohibit the use of tests and taxes to accomplish the same result. See, e.g., Louisiana v. United
States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (invalidating the “understanding” test); Guinn v. United States, 238
U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating the “grandfather clause”); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp.
353 (E.D. La. 1963) (three-judge court) (invalidating the “interpretation” test), aff’d, 380 U.S. 145
(1965); Barry Sullivan, The Honest Muse: Judge Wisdom and the Uses of History, 60 TUL. L. REV.
314, 325–38 (1985) (discussing three-judge district court’s detailed history of the
disenfranchisement of African-Americans in Louisiana in United States v. Louisiana). The history
of racial discrimination in jury selection proceeded along parallel lines. In Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), the Court held that the Constitution prohibited any race-based
exclusion from jury service, but specifically left open the possibility that persons of color could be
excluded by other, theoretically “race-neutral” tests.
132. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. See, e.g., ELAINE WEISS, THE WOMAN’S HOUR: THE GREAT
FIGHT TO WIN THE VOTE 1 (2018) (detailing efforts to secure ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment in Tennessee). Many states granted women the right to vote prior to the adoption of
the Nineteenth Amendment. See CORRINE M. MCCONNAUGHY, THE WOMAN’S SUFFRAGE
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA: A REASSESSMENT 2 (2013) (“When the U.S. Constitution was finally
amended, more than half of the states already had adopted measures giving women voting rights in
at least some statewide elections, and fully three-fourths of the states had instituted some form of
voting rights for women.”).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. As one judge at the epicenter of the civil rights struggle wrote
in 1967, “[U]ntil Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
statutes with teeth, Congress and the executive had not acted affirmatively to enforce these rights
of national citizenship.” John Minor Wisdom, The Frictionmaking, Exacerbating Role of Federal
Courts, 21 SW. L.J. 411, 424 (1967). Instead, the political branches had left the enforcement of
these rights “to the judiciary, the branch of government least able to carry out enforcement in a
reasonable time and on a national scale.” Id. In 1965, as Judge Wisdom noted, Congress passed
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, which remains in effect and currently provides in relevant
part that,
No voting qualification or perquisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in
a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account
of race or color, or in contravention of [certain other] guarantees.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10314). In recent
years, the Supreme Court has seriously limited the force of this statute. See infra pp. 603–07.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
135. Some of these cases are discussed below. See infra pp. 603–07.
136. See Sullivan, supra note 94, at 217 (discussing limitations on voting rights).
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historical truth is,” as Atiba R. Ellis has observed, “that legal expansions
of the franchise invariably have been followed by the invention of new
barriers to its exercise.”137 As Professor Ellis has also noted, “[v]arious
arguments and beliefs advocating the exclusion of ‘unworthy’ voters
have regularly existed over time.”138 Moreover, “those arguments and
beliefs have regularly been used by those in power to justify the exclusion
from the franchise, either legally or practically, of those thought to be
their political adversaries.”139
As early as 1886, the Supreme Court recognized the critical
importance of the right to vote in a constitutional democracy, observing
that “the political franchise of voting” is rightly “regarded as a
fundamental political right because preservative of all rights.”140 Unlike
other fundamental rights, however, the exercise of the franchise requires
the intensive, affirmative involvement of the state. The very point of
voting is to have some voice in the governance of the state, and the right
to vote has no meaning apart from the existence and good order of the
state. Among other things, the state must establish electoral districts and
draw their respective boundaries; establish qualifications for candidates
and political parties who wish to contest elections; design ballots and
determine the order in which candidates and issues will appear on the
ballot; set the times and places for voting; organize polling places; hire
and train officials to monitor elections; and prescribe qualifications for
voting, procedures for registering to vote, and the means whereby
potential voters may establish their entitlement to vote in a particular
place at a particular time.
In other words, the right to vote is neither self-defining nor selfenforcing. On the contrary, the state wields a massive amount of power
with respect to the franchise, regulating every aspect of the electoral
process and determining, in effect, whether the “fundamental right” to
vote actually affords a meaningful opportunity to participate in the
political community. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has long
137. Ellis, supra note 95, at 883.
138. Id. Professor Ellis has further suggested that “the meme of voter fraud represents the latest
round of America’s evolution from an exclusion-based republic to an inclusive republic supporting
full participation of all citizens.” Id.
139. Sullivan, supra note 94, at 217. See also ALAN WOLFE, THE POLITICS OF PETULANCE:
AMERICA IN AN AGE OF IMMATURITY 88 (2018) (“Both the Republican Party and a significant
group of conservative pundits view the threat to democracy in quantitative terms. Too many people
vote, they believe, even if they do not say so explicitly, and the solution is to make it more difficult
for them to do so. Proponents of a classic conservative vision of government by the proper few,
these restrictionists are fully aware that the history of democracy is the history of the extension of
the franchise, and they want that history to stop.”).
140. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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approached issues relating to the franchise as political problems to be
solved by the political process, even when they involved the rights of a
racial minority that lacked any meaningful voice or influence in the
political process. An early manifestation of this approach is Giles v.
Harris, in which Justice Holmes observed that, if “the great mass of the
white population intends to keep the blacks from voting,” only the state
or “the legislative and political department” of the federal government
can grant “relief from [that] great political wrong.”141 In other words, the
righting of this “great political wrong” was no business of the courts.
A. The Colegrove Era
Although the Court eventually took a different view in cases in which
limitations on voting were undeniably linked to racial discrimination, the
deferential approach that Justice Holmes articulated in Giles would
otherwise define the Court’s role in this area for many years.142 In 1946,
for example, in Colegrove v. Green,143 a closely divided Court affirmed
the dismissal of a challenge to Illinois’ congressional districts on
justiciability grounds.144 The Colegrove decision is noteworthy because
of the conviction with which a plurality of the Court articulated a
principle of judicial non-interference in the electoral process—regardless
of the extent to which the democratic process might have been corrupted.
The gist of the Colegrove complaint was that Illinois, despite significant
population shifts, had failed for decades to reapportion its congressional
districts, which therefore lacked approximate equality of population and
compactness of territory.145 As things stood, a vote in one Illinois
141. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903).
142. On several occasions during the first half of the twentieth century, the Court struck down
laws designed to prevent African Americans from voting in primary elections. See generally Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536 (1927). As a general matter, however, the Court adhered to the approach that Justice
Holmes suggested in Giles.
143. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
144. Id. at 565–66.
145. Id. at 550–51. Perhaps for obvious reasons, Justice Frankfurter gave little attention in his
plurality opinion to the plaintiffs’ undisputed factual allegations. Justice Black filled in the detail
in his dissenting opinion:
The complaint alleges the following facts essential to the position I take: Appellants,
citizens and voters of Illinois, live in congressional election districts, the respective
populations of which range from 612,000 to 914,000. Twenty other congressional
districts have populations that range from 112,116 to 385,207. In seven of these districts
the population is below 200,000. The Illinois Legislature established these districts in
1901 on the basis of the Census of 1900. The Federal Census of 1910, of 1920, of 1930,
and of 1940, each showed a growth of population in Illinois and a substantial shift in the
distribution of population among the districts established in 1901. . . . [A]ttempts to have
State Legislature reapportion congressional election districts so as more nearly to
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congressional district was worth nine times what it was worth in another
district.146 But the Court thought that it could do nothing to cure this
democratic deficit. In the plurality’s view, any judicial intervention
would disrespect the democratic process.
Justice Frankfurter, who announced the judgment of the Court,147
thought that the requested relief was “beyond [the Court’s] competence
to grant” because the issue presented was “of a peculiarly political nature
and therefore not meet for judicial determination.”148 He also implicitly
rejected the gist of plaintiffs’ substantive complaint, namely, that their
constitutional rights were violated because their votes had less value than
those cast in less populous electoral districts.149 He did so on the ground
that “[t]he basis for this suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered
by Illinois as a polity.”150 Justice Frankfurter characterized the case as
an appeal to the federal courts to reconstruct the electoral process of
Illinois in order that it may be adequately represented in the councils of
equalize their population have been unsuccessful. A contributing cause of this situation,
according to appellants, is the fact that the State Legislature is chosen on the basis of
state election districts inequitably apportioned in a way similar to that of the 1901
congressional election districts. The implication is that the issues of state and
congressional apportionment are thus so interdependent that it is to the interest of state
legislators to perpetuate the inequitable apportionment of both state and congressional
election districts. Prior to this proceeding, a series of suits had been brought in the state
courts challenging the State’s local and federal apportionment system. In all these cases,
the Supreme Court of the State had denied effective relief.
Id. at 566–67 (Black, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 569.
147. Justices Reed and Burton concurred in Justice Frankfurter’s opinion. Id. at 550 (Reed, J.,
concurring). Justice Rutledge concurred only in the judgment, id. at 564 (Rutledge, J., concurring),
and Justice Black dissented, joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy. Id. at 566, 574 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Justice Jackson did not participate in the decision. Id. at 556. Justice Frankfurter made
clear that the question presented was not one that the courts could or should decide. He thought the
district court was “clearly right” in dismissing the complaint based on Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1
(1932), which held that the Reapportionment Act of 1929 “has no requirements ‘as to the
compactness, contiguity and equality in population districts,’” but he “also agree[d] with the four
Justices . . . [in Wood] who [thought] the bill . . . should be dismissed for want of equity.” Id. at 551
(plurality opinion). As Justice Black pointed out, however, the plaintiffs also alleged constitutional
violations, claiming that their “right to have their vote counted is abridged unless that vote is given
approximately equal weight to that of other citizens.” Id. at 567–68. (Black, J., dissenting)
148. Id. at 552 (plurality opinion).
149. Justice Black observed:
No one would deny that the equal protection clause would . . . prohibit a law that would
expressly give certain citizens a half vote and others a full vote. The probable effect of
the 1901 State Apportionment Act will be that certain citizens, and among them the
appellants, will, in some instances, have votes only one-ninth as effective in choosing
representatives to Congress as the votes of other citizens. Such discriminatory legislation
seems to me exactly the kind that the equal protection clause was intended to prohibit.
Id. at 569 (Black, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 552 (plurality opinion).
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the nation. Because the Illinois legislature has failed to revise its . . .
districts in order to reflect great changes, during more than a generation,
we are asked to do this, as it were, for Illinois.151

Based on that characterization, Justice Frankfurter reasoned that remapping the state to create fair congressional districts was beyond the
capacity of the courts, and that the most that any court could do in these
circumstances would be to issue a declaration that the electoral system
was invalid.152 If the court did that, and the Illinois legislature then chose
not to redistrict, members of Congress would have to be chosen on a
statewide basis, contrary to Congress’s statutorily expressed preference
for single-member districts.153
In other words, Justice Frankfurter thought that the Court should not
engage the constitutional issues presented in Colegrove, because, if the
Court found the districts unconstitutional, and if the Illinois legislature
then chose not to act in response to that determination, Illinois would
have to conduct its congressional elections on an at-large basis, which
would be contrary to Congress’s expressed preference for single-member
districts.154 Justice Frankfurter’s concern is somewhat mystifying
because the potential enforcement problem he flagged seems nothing if
not routine.155 If the Illinois statute is unconstitutional, the Court’s duty

151. Id.
152. Id. at 553.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Justice Frankfurter, obviously wishing to make a broad statement about the justiciability
of such challenges, did not rely on the particular circumstances of the case, including the short time
available to prepare for the next election. Justice Rutledge, however, noted that fact in his
concurrence:
The shortness of the time remaining makes it doubtful whether action could, or would,
be taken in time to secure for petitioners the effective relief they seek. To force them to
share in an election at large might bring greater equality of voting right. It would also
deprive them and all other Illinois citizens of representation by districts which the
prevailing policy of Congress commands.
Id. at 565–66 (plurality opinion). Although Justice Rutledge concurred only in the judgment, the
remainder of his opinion suggested some degree of agreement with Justice Frankfurter’s overall
approach:
If the constitutional provisions on which appellants rely give them the substantive rights
they urge, other provisions qualify those rights . . . by vesting large measures of control
in the political subdivisions of the Government and the state. There is not, and could not
be, except abstractly, a right of absolute equality in voting. At best, there could be only
a rough approximation. And there is obviously considerable latitude for the bodies vested
with those powers to exercise their judgment concerning how best to attain this, in full
consistency with the Constitution.
Id. at 566. Like Justice Frankfurter, however, he did not choose to answer Justice Black’s point that
the vote of some Illinois voters was worth nine times the vote of others. See id. at 569 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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is to say so, and it will be up to Illinois to take whatever corrective action
is necessary.
More illuminating, perhaps, is Justice Frankfurter’s broader policy
justification, namely, that the Court traditionally has “held aloof from”
controversies (like this one) that “bring courts into active and immediate
relations with party contests.” 156 According to Justice Frankfurter, “[i]t
is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of
the people. And it is no less pernicious if such judicial intervention in an
essentially political contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the
law.”157 In other words, it would be an affront to democracy for the Court
to insist that Illinois alter an electoral system in which one citizen’s vote
was worth nine times what another citizen’s vote is worth.
Justice Frankfurter was unmoved by the Colegrove plaintiffs’
argument that the case involved “grave evils” and matters of “public
morality”158 for the additional reason that Congress was authorized to
intervene if it wished to do so:
The . . . Constitution has conferred upon Congress exclusive authority
to secure fair representation by the States in the popular House and left
to that House determination whether States have fulfilled their
responsibility. If Congress failed in exercising its powers, whereby
standards of fairness are offended, the remedy ultimately lies with the
people. Whether Congress faithfully discharges its duty or not, the
subject has been committed to the exclusive control of Congress.159

Concluding his opinion, Justice Frankfurter again asserted that,
notwithstanding the seriousness of the claims, history showed that such
matters—“embroiled,” as they were, “in politics, in the sense of party
contests and party interests”—were for the political branches to

156. Id. at 553–54 (plurality opinion). Justice Black responded to this point:
It is true that voting is a part of elections, and that elections are ‘political.’ But, as this
Court [has] said . . . it is a mere ‘play upon words’ to refer to a controversy such as this
as ‘political’ in the sense that courts have nothing to do with protecting and vindicating
the right of a voter to cast an effective ballot.
Id. at 572–73 (Black, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 553–54 (plurality opinion).
158. Id. at 554.
159. Id. Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution grants state legislatures the power to
prescribe the “Times, places, and Manner of holding Elections” for Members of Congress, but it
reserves to Congress the power to “alter or amend” those regulations. U.S. C ONST. art I, § 4, cl. 1.
Congress had previously enacted requirements with respect to contiguous territory, compactness,
and equality of population, but those provisions were no longer in effect at the time of Colegrove.
See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 555 (explaining that the 1929 Reinforcement Act dropped those
previous requirements). Ironically, Justice Frankfurter attached to his opinion an appendix that
showed how widespread was the problem of disparities in apportionment, and, thus, how great and
systematic had been the House’s disregard of its constitution al obligation. Id. at 557.
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decide.160 Indeed, “the most glaring disparities have prevailed as to the
contours and the population of districts” in the past, but “[i]t never
occurred to anyone that this Court could issue mandamus to compel
Congress to perform its mandatory duty to apportion.”161 Thus,
[t]o sustain this action would cut very deep into the very being of
Congress. Courts ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy
for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will
apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress. The
Constitution has many commands that are not enforceable by courts
because they clearly fall outside the conditions and purposes that
circumscribe judicial action. . . . The duty to see to it that the laws are
faithfully executed cannot be brought under legal compulsion. . . . The
Constitution has left the performance of many duties in our
governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and
legislative action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in
exercising their political rights.162

In dissent, Justice Black pointed out that the problem seemed incapable
of resolution by the political process. The Illinois legislature, which was
similarly malapportioned, was unwilling to act, as was Illinois’ elected
judiciary.163
B. The Warren and Burger Courts
The Supreme Court shifted gears in the early 1960s. The Court seemed
to manifest a new understanding of the importance of fairness in
elections, a new appreciation for the many ways in which the electoral
process can be manipulated for personal and partisan advantage, and a
recognition that only the judiciary—particularly the unelected federal
judiciary—is capable of ensuring the fairness of the electoral process.
Thus, the Court began to act consistent with the understanding that the
courts have a special responsibility for safeguarding the integrity of the
democratic process.164
160. Id. at 554.
161. Id. at 555.
162. Id. at 556.
163. Id. at 567–69 (Black, J., dissenting).
164. In its efforts to safeguard the right to vote, the Court relied on several different
constitutional provisions. More generally, the Court’s approach seems rooted in concerns similar
to those that Justice Stone expressed in Carolene Products, at least insofar as circumstances may
exist that may interfere with the ordinary operation of the democratic process. See United States v.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about the repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny. . . . Nor need we enquire
into whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular
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In 1960, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,165 the Court invalidated a twentyeight-sided municipal boundary that excluded virtually all AfricanAmericans (and virtually no whites) from participation in the relevant
political community. Notably, the Court rejected the defendants’
contention that the controversy involved a non-justiciable political
question.166 In an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, the Court gave short
shrift to the defendants’ reliance on Colegrove. That case was
distinguishable, according to Justice Frankfurter, because it did not
involve allegations of racial discrimination in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. In Gomillion, on the other hand, the plaintiffs alleged that
the municipality’s action was based on racial animus.167
Two years later, in Baker v. Carr,168 the Court determined that state
general assembly districts should be roughly equal in population,169 and
that challenges to the apportionment of districts were not barred by the
political question doctrine.170 In 1964, in Wesberry v. Sanders, the Court
religious . . . or national, . . . or racial minorities [or] whether prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition . . . call[ing] for a . . . more searching
judicial inquiry.
Id.
165. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U.S. 339 (1960).
166. The Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, which had affirmed the district
court's determination that it lacked the "power to change any boundaries of municipal corporations
fixed by a duly convened and elected legislative body, acting for the people in the State of
Alabama." Id. at 340–41. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the complaint alleged a violation
of the Fifteenth Amendment, and that, "if proven, [these allegations] would abundantly establish
that Act 140 was not an ordinary geographic redistricting measure even within familiar abuses of
gerrymandering." Id. at 341. The Court therefore observed that, "[i]t is difficult to appreciate what
stands in the way of adjudging a statute having this inevitable effect invalid in light of the principles
by which this Court must judge, and uniformly has judged, statutes that, howsoever speciously
defined, obviously discriminate against colored citizens." Id. at 342.
167. In Gomillion, Justice Frankfurter wrote that, “[t]he [Colegrove] complaint rested upon the
disparity of population between the different districts which rendered the effectiveness of each
individual's vote in some districts far less than in others. This disparity came to pass solely through
shifts in population between 1901, when Illinois organized its congressional districts, and 1946,
when the complaint was lodged. During this entire period elections were held under the districting
scheme devised in 1901. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it
presented a subject not meet for adjudication... The decisive facts in this case . . . are wholly different
from the considerations found controlling in Colegrove.” Id. at 346. In other words, the allegations
of racial discrimination in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment placed this case within the line of
cases that included Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927). See supra note 142 (noting that the Court had departed from Giles in cases involving racial
discrimination).
168. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 192–94 (1962). In Baker v. Carr, the Tennessee general
assembly districts had not been reapportioned since 1901 (despite a decennial reapportionment
provision in the Tennessee Constitution), and some districts had populations ten times the size of
others. Id. at 192–94.
169. Id. at 207–09.
170. In Baker, the Court effectively overruled the portion of Colegrove holding that the political
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held that congressional districts should be apportioned so that “as nearly
as practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth
as much as another’s.”171 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Black
reviewed the debates concerning the creation of the House of
Representatives and concluded, with respect to congressional elections,
that,
It is not surprising that our Court has held that [Article I] gives persons
qualified to vote a constitutional right to vote and to have their votes
counted. . . . No right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under
which . . . we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory
if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for
classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this
right.172

Also in 1964, the Court decided Reynolds v. Sims, a case involving the
apportionment of both chambers of the Georgia state legislature.173 The
Court held “that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection
Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state
legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.”174 Likewise, in
Carrington v. Rash, the Court invalidated a Texas statute that treated
military personnel as residents of the state from which they had joined
the service, thus precluding them from becoming Texas voters, without
regard to the length of time they had lived in Texas or any intent they
might have had to stay there permanently.175
In 1966, in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, the Court
struck down the Virginia poll tax, holding that “a State violates the Equal
Protection Clause . . . whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or the
payment of any fee an electoral standard.”176 The Court further noted that
“wealth or fee-paying has . . . no relation to voting qualifications; the
right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or
conditioned.”177
question doctrine barred challenges to apportionment decisions. Baker, 369 U.S. at 206.
171. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
172. Id. at 17–18.
173. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
174. Id. at 568.
175. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96–97 (1965).
176. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elecs., 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
177. Id. at 670. In reaching that conclusion, the Court overruled its decision in Breedlove v.
Suttles, 302 U.S. 377 (1937), which had upheld the constitutionality of provisions that conditioned
voting on the payment of a fee. See id. at 669. In addition, the Court distinguished Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), which upheld the constitutionality of
a literacy test on the ground that the ability to read and write “has some relation to standards
designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot.” Id. at 665–66.
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In the years following Harper, the Court decided a number of cases in
which the states had attempted to restrict the franchise with respect to
specific units of government or governmental purposes.178 Perhaps the
most significant was Dunn v. Blumstein,179 in which the Court invoked
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate
certain Tennessee residency provisions that required individuals to have
lived in the state for a year and in a particular county for three months to
qualify as voters.180 In an opinion by Justice Marshall, the Court found
that the Tennessee residency requirements implicated two fundamental
rights, namely, the right to vote and the right to travel. Because “such
laws force a person who wishes to travel and change residences to choose
between travel and the basic right to vote,” a state “may not burden the
right to travel in this way” unless it can demonstrate “a compelling state
interest.”181 In Dunn, the Court ultimately found that the state had failed
to make that showing.182
These cases from the 1960s and the early 1970s reflect the Court’s
sustained rejection of Justice Frankfurter’s non-interventionist approach
in Colegrove and a recognition that cool paeans to democracy are no
substitute for the judicial action necessary to protect the democratic
process. The Court’s jurisprudence from that period prompted John Hart
Ely to write that
Sometimes the voting cases, the malapportionment cases in particular,
are praised on the ground that they took care of a problem that
legislatures had refused to do anything about. That is true, but it is a

178. In Kramer v. Union Free School District No 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), for example, the
Court invalidated a New York statute that limited the franchise in certain school district elections
to those who (a) rented or owned real property within the school district, (b) were the spouses of a
property owner or lessor, and (3) the parent or guardian of a child attending a public school in the
district. Similarly, in Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), the Court struck down a
Louisiana statute that conditioned the right to vote with respect to bond issues on the ownership of
real property, and the Court held in Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970), that Maryland could
not deny the right to vote in state elections to persons who lived within the boundaries of the
National Institutes of Health, which is a federal enclave. Echoing Yick Wo, the Evans Court
emphasize that the right to vote was uniquely precious inasmuch as it is “protective of all
fundamental rights and privileges.” Evans, 398 U.S. at 422.
179. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
180. Id. at 359–60.
181. Id. at 342.
182. The Court noted that, “[i]t may well be true that new residents as a group know less about
state and local issues than older residents; and it is surely true that durational residence requirements
will exclude some people from voting who are totally uninformed about election matters.” Id. at
359–60. Further, the Court stated: “But as devices to limit the franchise to knowledgeable residents,
the conclusive presumptions of durational residence requirements are much too crude. They
exclude too many people who should not, and need not, be excluded. They represent a requirement
of knowledge unfairly imposed on only some citizens.” Id. at 360.

2019]

Democratic Conditions

607

dangerously incomplete account. There are many things legislatures
“haven’t done anything about” that should be left in precisely that
condition. A more complete account of the voting cases is that they
involve rights (1) that are essential to the democratic process and (2)
whose dimensions cannot safely be left to our elected representatives,
who have an obviously vested interest in the status quo.183

Professor Ely continued, quoting from Chief Justice Warren’s 1969
opinion for the Court in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15:
The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given ‘rational’
classifications in other types of enactments are based on an assumption
that institutions of state government are structured so as to represent
fairly all the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in
effect a challenge to this basic assumption, the assumption can no
longer serve as the basis for presuming constitutionality.184

Nowhere has Chief Justice Warren’s observation proved more accurate
than in the area of decennial redistricting, where incumbents effectively
have been empowered to choose their constituents, and the majority party
is free to draw district lines to maximize its political influence for the
decade to come.
C. The Roberts Court
More recently, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with respect to the
franchise has moved in a different direction,185 one that seems more in
line with Giles and Colegrove than with Gomillion and Baker. In fact, the
current Court’s approach is more extreme than Colegrove because the
Court has not only declined to intervene when overreaching majorities
have used their authority to set electoral rules entrenching their own
dominance, it has invalidated legislation on those rare occasions when
the political process has actually produced democracy-enforcing
legislation. In other words, the Court has moved on from Justice
Frankfurter’s non-intervention principle to what former Solicitor General
and Harvard Law School Professor Charles Fried has recently identified

183. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 117
(1980).
184. Id. (quoting Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1969)).
185. See, e.g., STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, UNFIT FOR DEMOCRACY: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE
BREAKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 119 (2016) (“The Court is often described as undemocratic
because the justices are not elected. But the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have been
increasingly undemocratic in a different way—their decisions have been dismissive of
malapportionment, gerrymandering, miscounting, and other ways to minimize the voting rights of
qualified voters.”).
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as “a long-term, shrewdly played but persistent program to get the law
out of anything to do with elections.”186
Even a brief account of the Court’s recent jurisprudence shows that
Professor Fried’s characterization is well-considered. In 2008, in
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of an Indiana law requiring persons who wished to vote
in person at polling places (but not in nursing homes or by absentee
ballot) to present a special, government-issued photo identification
card.187 Previously, such voters had only been required to verify their
identities by signing a “poll book,” which would be checked against
signatures on file. The state justified the new requirement as a measure
needed to combat the evil of voter fraud, but, as Justice Stevens conceded
in the lead opinion for the majority, “[t]he record contains no evidence of
any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.”188
Nor was there any evidence presented to show that the law would solve
that phantom problem.189 What the evidence did show was that the
Indiana law would effectively disenfranchise tens of thousands of voters
who lacked a valid form of photo ID, and who, incidentally, tended
disproportionately to be poor, members of minority groups, and likely
Democratic voters.190
In dissent, Justice Souter noted that the Indiana statute “threaten[ed] to
impose nontrivial burdens on the voting rights of tens of thousands of the
State’s citizens . . . and a significant percentage of those individuals are
likely to be deterred from voting.”191 In Justice Souter’s view,
[A] state may not burden the right to vote merely by invoking abstract
interests, be they legitimate . . . or even compelling, but must make a
particular factual showing that threats to its interests outweigh the
particular impediment it has imposed. The State has made no such

186. Nina Totenberg, Fear and Loathing at the Supreme Court—What is Chief Justice John
Roberts Up To?, NPR (July 8, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/08/738930098/fear-andloathing-at-the-supreme-court-what-is-chief-justice-john-roberts-up-to (interviewing Charles
Fried, Harvard Law School professor, Reagan Administration Solicitor General, and former Justice
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court). Alluding to Chief Justice Roberts’s confirmation
testimony, Professor Fried further noted that, “There’s no doubt there’s an agenda here. . . . This is
not balls and strikes.” Id. Totenberg summarized parts of the interview that were not aired: “Fried
catalogs Roberts’ decisions in this regard. He wrote the court’s 5-4 decision striking down the
Voting Rights Act, a law passed and reenacted repeatedly by large and bipartisan congressional
majorities. He wrote or participated in a series of decisions striking down longstanding and newer
limits on campaign contributions.” Id.
187. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Elec. Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 181–82 (2008).
188. Id. at 194.
189. Id. at 195.
190. Id. at 186–89.
191. Id. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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justification here, and as to some aspects of its law, it has hardly even
tried.192

In 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court
declared certain federal campaign finance limitations imposed by the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002193 to be
unconstitutional on their face.194 The case arose when Citizens United, a
nonprofit corporation, developed a highly partisan, ninety-minute
“documentary” movie entitled Hillary: The Movie, in connection with the
2008 presidential election. The movie presented Senator Clinton and her
husband, former President Bill Clinton, in a very negative light. Citizens
United wished to advertise the movie, and release it for on-demand
viewing, in the thirty-day period preceding the last 2008 Democratic
primary contest.195 Because Citizens United anticipated that its planned
advertising campaign and release of the movie during the run-up to the
last Democratic primary contest might run afoul of the Federal Election
Campaign Act, it brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief
against the Federal Election Commission.196 The case was initially heard
by a three-judge district court, which held in favor of the Commission,
and Citizens United appealed to the Supreme Court.197
Although Citizens United had initially mounted only an “as applied”
challenge to the statute, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the statute
was facially unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment
rights of corporations.198 The case was noteworthy for several reasons.
To begin with, the Court decided, after hearing oral argument, that
Citizens United’s framing of its claim as an “as applied” constitutional
claim was too narrow. Therefore, the Court ordered additional briefing
and re-argument on broader grounds. Setting the case for re-argument
ultimately allowed the Court to overrule prior case law that Citizens
United had not challenged and to strike down the relevant statutory

192. Id. In Crawford, the Supreme Court affirmed a divided decision of the Seventh Circuit.
See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Elec. Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007). Judge Posner, who wrote the
majority opinion in the court of appeals, later conceded that the case was wrongly decided. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 85 (2013) (noting that his decision was wrong).
193. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
(codified at scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.).
194. Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009). The Court decided the case in what was
substantially a 5-4 decision.
195. Id. at 887–88.
196. Id. at 888.
197. Id. at 887–88.
198. Id. at 917.
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provision as unconstitutional on its face, rather than “as applied,” as
Citizens United had urged.199
Most important, Citizens United represented the triumph of Justice
Kennedy’s peculiar understanding of representative politics, one in which
“[f]avoritism and influence” are deemed to be unavoidable, and the
government’s only legitimate constitutional interest in regulating
campaign finance is the prevention of quid pro quo corruption.200 “It is
well understood,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “that a substantial and
legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or make a
contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate will
respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors.
Democracy is premised on responsiveness.”201 Not surprisingly, this is
an approach that the Court previously had rejected as a “crabbed view of
corruption” and one that failed to reflect “the realities of political

199. See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Beyond Judicial Activism: When the Supreme Court Is No
Longer a Court, 14 U. PA. J. CON. LAW 161, 175–83 (2011) (detailing history of Supreme Court’s
consideration of the case). Ironically, Justice Kennedy described the Court’s task in the formulaic
language the Court typically uses: “In this case we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect,
McConnell.” Citizens United, 557 U.S. at 311 (Kennedy, J.). Of course, the question the Court
answered was one that the Court asked itself. As Justice Stevens stated in his partial dissent,
“[e]ssentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they
changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.” Id. at 398 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Expanding the case in this way allowed the Court to rule
broadly that, “[t]he Government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and
disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether,” id. at 416 (Kennedy, J.),
and to hold that its previous decision in Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990), should be overruled, because the Court was wrong in Austin to think that “political speech
may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity.” Citizens United, 557 U.S. at 319.
Contrary to the majority opinion, Justice Stevens pointed out that “the real question in this case
concerns how, not if, the appellant may finance its electioneering.” Id. at 415 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Further, Justice Stevens observed:
Citizens United is a wealthy nonprofit corporation that runs a political action committee
(PAC) with millions of dollars in assets. Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA), it could have used those assets to televise and promote Hillary: The
Movie wherever and whenever it wanted to. It also could have spent unrestricted sums
to broadcast Hillary at any time other than the 30 days before the last primary election.
Neither Citizens United’s nor any other corporation’s speech has been “banned.” All that
the parties dispute is whether Citizens United had the right to use the funds in its general
treasury to pay broadcasts during the 30-day period. The notion that the First
Amendment dictates an affirmative answer to that question is, in my judgment,
profoundly misguided. Even more misguided is the notion that the Court must rewrite
the law relating to campaign expenditures by for-profit corporations and unions to decide
this case.
Id. at 393–94.
200. Id. at 359.
201. Id.
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fundraising.”202 Eric Berger has convincingly described the significance
of the Court’s switch:
The Court’s vision of representative democracy, then, accepts rent
seeking and speech supporting it as inevitable features of our
governmental system. On this view, Congress’s evidence that campaign
contributions “corrupt,” established only what Justice Kennedy deemed
inherent in our governmental system. Many businesses and other
interest groups contribute to political candidates precisely because they
hope that those candidates, if elected, will pass laws favorable to those
contributors. Far from lamenting this state of affairs, the Court accepted
it as inevitable. Accordingly, no congressional findings short of quid
pro quo could justify regulations that so substantially impinged on
campaign contributors’ First Amendment rights.203

In other words, “pay to play” is the American way. Justice Stevens
took a different view. In his partial dissent, Justice Stevens recognized
that limiting the permissible scope of campaign finance regulation to quid
pro quo corruption could not possibly serve the public interest in fair
elections, let alone promote public confidence in the electoral process.
According to Justice Stevens, “[t]he majority cavalierly ignores
Congress’ factual findings and its constitutional judgment: It
acknowledges the validity of the interest in preventing corruption, but it
effectively discounts the value of that interest to zero.”204 Justice Stevens
further observed that,

202. Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 249 (2010) (quoting
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 152 (2003)); see also Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the
Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 585–86 (2011) (arguing that Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), represents an essentially incoherent set of compromises, the most
significant being that which permits the government to limit campaign contributions,” but not
“spending . . . due to a lack of evidence that independent spending could corrupt candidates,” and
that “the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence has swung like a pendulum toward and away
from deference, as Court personnel changed and Justices (occasionally) voted inconsistently.”). In
his early report on the Roberts Court, Michael Kang noted that it was proving to be much less
deferential to the government on campaign finance regulation than the Rehnquist Court had been.
Kang, supra, at 248.
203. Eric Berger, When Facts Don’t Matter, 2017 BYU L. REV. 525, 563 (2018). According to
Michael Kang, “[t]aken to its logical extreme, Justice Kennedy’s view of corruption may limit
campaign finance restrictions to not much beyond the regulation of contributions to candidates and
officeholders. Only candidates and officeholders possess access to government power that gives
rise to the risk of quid pro quo exchange.” Kang, supra note 202, at 250.
Even more intriguing are the implications of Citizens United’s deeper reasoning for the
regulation of contributions as a general matter, whatever their source. . . . [T]he Court
may be skeptical about a risk of quid pro quo corruption inherent in a contribution to
someone other than a candidate or officeholder, at least when those funds are not later
used to make a contribution to a candidate or officeholder.
Id. at 251.
204. Citizens United, 557 U.S. at 463 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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[T]he majority declares by fiat that the appearance of undue influence
by high-spending corporations ‘will not cause the electorate to lose faith
in our democracy.’ . . . The electorate itself has consistently indicated
otherwise, both in opinion polls . . . and in laws its representatives have
passed, and our colleagues have no basis for elevating their own
optimism into a tenet of constitutional law.205

In 2013, in Shelby County v. Holder, the Court once again struck down
an important legislative initiative aimed at increasing the fairness of
elections.206 In Shelby County, the Court invalidated a central feature of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which Congress enacted to address
entrenched racial discrimination in voting, “an insidious and pervasive
evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through
unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”207 Section 5 of
the Act contains a “preclearance” procedure that requires certain states
and local governments to obtain a determination from the Attorney
General or a three-judge district court that proposed changes to their
voting laws or practices would not “deny or abridge the right to vote on
account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group.”208
Section 4(b) contains the coverage formula for determining which states
and local governments are subject to preclearance under Section 5.209
205. Id. at 458 n.64. Justice Stevens further noted that, “While American democracy is
imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court would have thought that its flaws included a dearth
of corporate money in politics.” Id. at 458. As Richard Pildes has observed, Justice Stevens’s sense
of the electorate proved correct in the aftermath of Citizens United, when polling showed that 80
percent of Americans opposed the decision, while 65 percent strongly opposed it. Richard H. Pildes,
Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 111–12; Berger,
supra note 203, at 525 n.351.
206. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). The Court struck down Section 4(b) by a 5-4
vote.
207. Id. at 535 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966)). The Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Act by an 8-1 vote in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301 (1966). Justice Black, the sole dissenter, argued that Congress had exceeded its constitutional
authority by adopting the preclearance provision. By preventing “some of the States” from adopting
state laws or constitutional amendments “without first being compelled to beg federal authorities
to approve their policies,” Justice Black thought that the preclearance provision “so distorts our
constitutional structure of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution
between state and federal power almost meaningless.” Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 353 (Black, J.,
concurring).
208. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 537.
209. Id. at 538. The formula covers jurisdictions that, as of November 1964, November 1968,
or November 1972, maintained a prohibited “test or device” as a condition of voting or registering
to vote and had a voting-age population of which less than 50 percent either were registered to vote
or actually voted in that year’s presidential election. Id. at 537–38. The Act was re-enacted, as
amended, in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006. See id. at 537–39. The Court upheld the constitutionality
of the 1970 re-enactment in Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 535 (1973). The 1975 reenactment was upheld in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 187 (1980), and the 1982
re-enactment was upheld in Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266, 287 (1999). The
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In Shelby County, the Court granted certiorari to decide whether
Congress’s 2006 reauthorization of Section 5—together with the existing
Section 4(b) coverage formula—exceeded Congress’s authority under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth
Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution.210
President George W. Bush signed the 2006 reauthorization after it was
passed by overwhelming bipartisan majorities in both Houses. 211 Chief
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito,
held that Section 4(b) exceeded Congress’s power to enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.212 The Chief Justice reasoned
that the coverage formula violated federalism and the “equal sovereignty
of the states” because its differential treatment of the states is “based on
40 year-old facts” and is not responsive to current needs.213 The Court
further noted that the country “has changed” since the coverage formula
was last modified in 1975—in large part because of the effectiveness of
the Act—“and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much,
Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem
speaks to current conditions.”214 The Court did not find Section 5 to be
unconstitutional, but the invalidation of Section 4(b) rendered Section 5
inoperative.
Justice Ginsburg dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Ginsburg wrote:
In the Court’s view, the very success of §5 of the Voting Rights Act
demands its dormancy. Congress was of another mind. Recognizing
constitutionality of the 2006 re-enactment was challenged in Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201 (2009), but the Court did not reach that issue.
210. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 555–57.
211. Justice Ginsburg described the process in her dissenting opinion:
In May 2006, the bills . . . were introduced in both Houses. . . . The House held further
hearings of considerable length, as did the Senate . . . . In mid-July, the House . . . passed
the reauthorization by a vote of 390 yeas to 33 nays. . . . The bill was read and debated
in the Senate, where it passed by a vote of 98 to 0. . . . President Bush signed it a week
later, . . . recognizing the need for “further work . . . in the fight against injustice,” and
calling the reauthorization “an example of our continued commitment to a united
America where every person is valued and treated with dignity and respect.
Id. at 564–65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In addition, she noted that,
The record supporting the 2006 reauthorization . . . was described by the Chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee as ‘one of the most extensive considerations of any piece
of legislation that the United States Congress has dealt with in the 27 1⁄2 years’ he had
served in the House.
Id. at 593 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
212. Justice Thomas would have found Section 5 to be unconstitutional as well. Id. at 557
(Thomas, J., concurring).
213. Id. at 556–57.
214. Id. at 557.
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that large progress has been made, Congress determined, based on a
voluminous record, that the scourge of discrimination was not yet
extirpated. The question this case presents is who decides whether, as
currently operative, §5 remains justifiable, this Court, or a Congress
charged with the obligation to enforce the post-Civil War Amendments
“by appropriate legislation.” With overwhelming support in both
Houses, Congress concluded that, for two prime reasons, §5 should
continue in force, unabated. First, continuance would facilitate
completion of the impressive gains thus far made; and second,
continuance would guard against backsliding. Those assessments were
well within Congress’ province to make and should elicit this Court’s
unstinting approbation.215

Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that Congress’s enforcement authority
was not without limits, but she pointedly reminded the Court that its role
was also limited. Justice Ginsburg observed that the Court’s proper role
was not to substitute its judgment for that of Congress, but only “to
determine whether the legislative record sufficed to show that ‘Congress
could rationally have determined that [its chosen] provisions were
appropriate methods.’”216 Justice Ginsburg thought that Congress had
met that test. She recalled the many unsuccessful efforts to combat
discrimination in the electoral process, repeated the majority’s
acknowledgement that “no one doubts” that discrimination in voting still
exists,217 and emphasized that the Voting Rights Act had “worked to
combat voting discrimination where other remedies had been tried and
failed.”218 She also emphasized that the preclearance requirement
applicable to those “regions of the country with the most aggravated
records of rank discrimination against minority voting rights” had been
particularly effective.219
But just as new forms of discrimination had constantly appeared before
the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, they had begun to appear again.
Justice Ginsburg wrote:
Second-generation barriers come in various forms. One of the
blockages is racial gerrymandering, the redrawing of legislative
districts in an “effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting.” . . .
Another is adoption of a system of at-large voting in lieu of district-bydistrict voting in a city with a sizable black minority. By switching to
at-large voting, the overall majority could control the election of each
city council member, effectively eliminating the potency of the
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 559–60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 570 (quoting City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176–77 (1980)).
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id.
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minority’s votes. . . . A similar effect could be achieved if the city
engaged in discriminatory annexation by incorporating majority-white
areas into city limits. . . . Whatever the device employed, this Court has
long recognized that vote dilution, when adopted with a discriminatory
purpose, cuts down the right to vote as certainly as denial of access to
the ballot.220

Quoting from a House report on the bill, Justice Ginsburg observed
that, “[d]iscrimination today is more subtle than the visible methods used
in 1965,” but “the effect and results are the same, namely a diminishing
of the minority community’s ability to fully participate in the electoral
process and to elect their preferred candidates.”221 Significantly, Justice
Ginsburg also called attention to several recent instances in which
“covered jurisdictions” had attempted to enact new barriers to voting, but
had failed in those efforts because of the preclearance provision.222
Finally, in 2019, in Rucho v. Common Cause, the Court decided by a
5-4 vote that challenges to extreme partisan gerrymanders are nonjusticiable.223 Speaking through Chief Justice Roberts, the Court
acknowledged that “the [Maryland and North Carolina] districting plans
at issue here are highly partisan, by any measure.”224 According to the
Chief Justice, however, the question for the Court was “whether there is
an ‘appropriate role for the Federal judiciary’ in remedying the problem
of partisan gerrymandering—whether such claims are claims of legal
right, resolvable according to legal principles, or political questions that
must find their resolution elsewhere.”225 The Court chose the second
alternative.
Among other things, the Court noted the difficulty of adjudicating
partisan gerrymanders.226 The Court first observed that, “[a]ny standard
for resolving such claims must be grounded in a ‘limited and precise
rationale’ and be ‘clear, manageable, and politically neutral,’” because
“‘[t]he opportunity to control the drawing of electoral boundaries through
the legislative process is a critical and traditional part of politics.’”227 But

220. Id. at 563–64.
221. Id. (quoting H. R. REP. No. 109-478, at 6 (2006)).
222. Id. at 579–80. From that fact one might infer that, absent the preclearance provision,
covered jurisdictions might enact many more barriers to voting, and that has indeed been the case.
See generally, CAROL ANDERSON, ONE PERSON, NO VOTE: HOW VOTER SUPPRESSION IS
DESTROYING OUR DEMOCRACY (2018) (detailing effects of Shelby County decision).
223. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2497–98 (2019).
224. Id. at 2491.
225. Id. at 2494 (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926–37 (2018)).
226. Among other things, the Court stated that partisan gerrymanders have proved “far more
difficult to adjudicate” than racial gerrymanders. Id. at 2497.
227. Id. at 2498 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986)).
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“the question [in partisan gerrymandering cases] is one of degree: How
to ‘provid[e] a standard for deciding how much partisan dominance is too
much.’”228 To act without a clear standard “would risk assuming
political, not legal, responsibility for a process that often produces ill will
and distrust.”229 Among other things, the Court suggested, the courts
would have to choose among “different versions of fairness,” which
“poses basic questions that are political, not legal.”230
In language reminiscent of Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Colegrove,
Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “Excessive partisanship in districting leads
to results that reasonably seem unjust. But the fact that such
gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with democratic principles,’ . . . does
not mean that the solution lies with the federal judiciary.” 231 Also like
Justice Frankfurter, the Chief Justice contended that the absence of a
federal remedy did not mean that nothing could be done about partisan
gerrymanders. He therefore pointed to other possible (if highly
implausible) solutions to the problem: “Our conclusion does not condone
excessive partisan gerrymandering. Nor does our conclusion condemn
complaints about districting to echo into a void.”232 In support of his
contention concerning the availability of other remedies, he noted that
one state supreme court had intervened in such a case, that three states
had either created multi-member redistricting commissions or created the
position of state demographer to draw district lines, and that a handful of
states had enacted redistricting criteria, as either a statutory or
constitutional matter.233 In addition, the Constitution grants Congress
some degree of legislative authority with respect to the matter of
congressional districts, and it is possible that Congress might choose to
exercise that authority in the future, although it has not chosen to do so
in the past.234
Justice Kagan dissented in an exceptionally hard-hitting opinion joined
by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. She summarized the
reasons for her dissent in the opening paragraphs of her opinion, which
warrant close attention. She first focuses on the Court’s invocation of the
political question doctrine and on the singular importance of the
constitutional values that the Court refuses to vindicate:

228. Id. (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006)).
229. Id. (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004)).
230. Id. at 2500.
231. Id. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. AIRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2586 (2015)).
232. Id. at 2507.
233. Id. In her dissent, Justice Kagan points out that these alternatives have generally met with
little success. Id. at 2524 (Kagan, J., dissenting). See also infra text accompanying notes 243–46.
234. Id. at 2508.
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For the first time ever, the Court refuses to remedy a constitutional
violation because it thinks the task beyond judicial capabilities.
And not just any constitutional violation. The partisan gerrymanders
in these cases deprived citizens of the most fundamental of their
constitutional rights: the rights to participate equally in the political
process, to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to choose
their political representatives. In doing so, the partisan gerrymanders
here debased and dishonored our democracy, turning upside-down the
core American idea that all governmental power derives from the
people. These gerrymanders enabled politicians to entrench themselves
in office as against voters’ preferences. They promoted partisanship
above respect for the popular will. They encouraged a politics of
polarization and dysfunction. If left unchecked, gerrymanders like the
ones here may irreparably damage our system of government.235

After reiterating the importance of the right to vote, and describing the
effects that extreme partisan gerrymanders have on the political process,
Justice Kagan proceeds to show, contrary to the majority’s account, that
finding a remedy for extreme partisan gerrymandering was not beyond
the ken or capacity of the courts:
And checking them is not beyond the courts. The majority’s abdication
comes just when courts across the country, including those below, have
coalesced around manageable standards to resolve partisan
gerrymandering claims. Those standards satisfy the majority’s own
benchmarks. They do not require—indeed, they do not permit—courts
to rely on their own ideas of electoral fairness, whether proportional
representation or any other. And they limit courts to correcting only
egregious gerrymanders, so judges do not become omnipresent players
in the political process. But yes, the standards used do allow—as well
they should—judicial intervention in the worst-of-the-worst cases of
democratic subversion, causing blatant constitutional harms.236

Later in the opinion, Justice Kagan notes that the majority apparently
agrees that extreme partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution
235. Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting). As Justice Black did in Colegrove, Justice Kagan
emphasizes the facts of the case in a way that the majority did not. See id. at 2509–12, 2517–19.
Justice Kagan states: “As I relate what happened in those two States, ask yourself: Is this how
American democracy is supposed to work?” Id. at 2509. She also notes that advancements in
computer technology have made gerrymanders “far more effective and durable than before,
insulating politicians against all but the most titanic shifts in the political tides,” and that
gerrymanders will only become more effective as time goes by. Id. at 2513. According to Justice
Kagan, the courts below “did not gaze into crystal balls, as the majority tries to suggest.” Id. at
2519. “They looked at the evidence—at the facts about how these districts operated—and they
could reach only one conclusion. By substantially diluting the votes of citizens favoring their rivals,
the politicians of one party had succeeded in entrenching themselves in office. They had beat
democracy.” Id.
236. Id. at 2509.
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because otherwise the question of judicially manageable standards, which
it emphasizes in its opinion, would not have come up.237 She observes
that,
So the only way to understand the majority’s opinion is as follows: In
the face of grievous harm to democratic governance and flagrant
infringements on individuals’ rights—in the face of escalating partisan
manipulation whose compatibility with this Nation’s values and law no
one defends—the majority declines to provide any remedy. . . . [T]he
majority declares that it can do nothing . . . because it has searched high
and low and cannot find a workable legal standard to apply.238

Justice Kagan dismisses the majority’s inability to identify a reliable
standard for appraising extreme political gerrymanders: “But in throwing
up its hands, the majority misses something under its nose: What it says
can’t be done has been done.”239 According to Justice Kagan, the
majority “throws a bevy of question marks on the page,” but “it never
tries to analyze the serious question presented here—whether the kind of
standard developed below falls prey to those objections, or instead allows
for neutral and manageable oversight.”240 She then proceeds to show that
the standard developed below does indeed allow for neutral and
manageable oversight.241 Moreover, the courts would not be
overwhelmed—and the sky certainly would not fall—if partisan
gerrymanders were held to be justiciable, because the context in which
such cases would be litigated would be entirely different: legislators
would stop bragging about their feats, plaintiffs would be put to their
proofs, and only the most egregious maps would be set aside.242
Finally, Justice Kagan noted that the majority was disingenuous in
proclaiming that the ordinary political process could solve the problem.
“Those harms arise,” she observed, “because politicians want to stay in
office. No one can look to them for effective relief.”243 Moreover, the
majority’s easy confidence that the problem could be solved, if not by
politicians, by the people directly, was also misplaced. To start with,
“[f]ewer than half the states offer voters an opportunity to put initiatives
to direct vote.”244 Nor are state courts likely to fill the void. Like the state
237. Id. at 2515.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2516.
240. Id. at 2519–20.
241. Id. at 2519–22.
242. Id. at 2522–23.
243. Id. at 2523.
244. Id. at 2524. Such efforts have met with little success. Moreover, the majority’s current
invocation of independent commissions as a solution is strained, to say the least. As Justice Kagan
observed, the Justices who now point to independent commissions as the solution to the problem
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court judges who declined to deal with the “rotten boroughs” involved in
Colegrove, many state court judges are elected (and subject to reelection). Not surprisingly, they may be even more reluctant than
unelected, life-tenured federal judges to grasp the nettle. They may also
lack an appropriate body of jurisprudence on which to draw.245 But the
problem remains. Among other things, “partisan gerrymandering has
‘sounded the death-knell of bi-partisanship,’ creating a legislative
environment that is ‘toxic’ and ‘tribal.’”246
In Giles and Colegrove, the Court emphasized its own limitations and
commended the political process as a remedy for gross manipulations of
the political process. The Court decreed that these problems were for the
people to remedy, but the Constitution and other factors made it difficult,
and probably impossible, for the people to do so. Beginning with
Gomillion and Baker, the Court recognized that there are some situations
in which the political process cannot police itself, and that the courts have
a special responsibility for protecting the democratic process in such
circumstances. More recently, however, the Supreme Court has declined
to act on that understanding and has at least implicitly repudiated that
role. The practices that the Court has either upheld or found immune to
judicial remedy, together with the limits it has imposed upon the political
branches, fundamentally distort the electoral process and compromise the
very concept of democratic representation. They are also certain to
further erode public confidence in our governmental institutions.

previously took the position that such commissions were unconstitutional:
The majority notes that voters themselves have recently approved ballot initiatives to put
power over districting in the hands of independent commissions or other nonpartisan
actors. . . . Some Members of the majority, of course, once [only four years ago] thought
such initiatives unconstitutional.
Id.
245. Of course, that is not to say that state courts will never rise to the challenge. Indeed, within
months of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho, a three-judge panel of the North Carolina
Superior Court, in a unanimous decision, invalidated the North Carolina legislative redistricting
plan because of partisan gerrymandering. See Common Cause v. David R. Lewis, No. 18 CVS
014001 (N.C. Super. Ct., Sept. 3, 2019), available at http://www.commoncause.org/north-carolina/
wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2019/09/Common-Cause-v.-Lewis-trial-court-decision-9.3.19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XB95-VLCK]. See also Amber Phillips, Why Democrats’ Big Gerrymandering
Win in North Carolina Matters, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2019/09/04/how-democrats-win-north-carolinas-redistricting-battle-could-reverberate/
[https://perma.cc/WW7W-4YRZ] (commenting on North Carolina court’s decision). But the
obstacles are substantial.
246. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. at 2525 (citing Brief for Amici Curiae Bipartisan
Group of 65 Current and Former State Legislators in Support of Appellees at 6, 25, Gill v. Whitford,
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16–1161)).
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CONCLUSION
Towards the end of Federalist No. 51, Madison observes that,
“[j]ustice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever
has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be
lost in the pursuit.”247 Those words are worth recalling as we conclude
this reflection on constitutional democracy and the fraught politics of our
time. What, after all, are the conditions of constitutional democracy? To
start, we know that constitutional democracy requires shared sacrifice and
hard work, but, as Danielle Allen reminds us, it also requires “a form of
citizenship that helps citizens generate trust enough among themselves to
manage sacrifice.”248 That trust is in short supply today.
Joan Williams and Robert Wuthnow tell us that one group of our
fellow citizens, the “left behind,” feel helpless and alienated from
democratic politics. Far from having trust in their fellow citizens or our
democratic institutions, the “left behind” express fury at what they deem
to be the cluelessness and snobbery of the ruling elites.249 Of course,
expressions of fury are not conducive to the sense of common purpose or
respect for the common good that the practice of constitutional
democracy requires. But it is not just the travails of those who have been
called the “left behind” that warrant our attention in this respect.
Members of other groups—those who have been the traditional objects
of discrimination by the majority—continue to feel the disadvantages and
effects of past discrimination. They also experience present
discrimination, in both its overt and subtle forms, as well as neglect—
while being suspected, ironically, of being the special favorites of the
ruling elites. That, too, breeds alienation and despair.
All of these factors feed into a toxic politics of fear and resentment that
politicians are able to exploit for their own advantage. The situation is
exacerbated by the fact that politicians—including, but not only, those
who seek power through the politics of fear and resentment—often
promise much and deliver little. That gap between promise and
performance further undermines the trust needed for democratic politics
and contributes to a climate of cynicism about the possibilities of
constitutional democracy.250 For these reasons, we can say that the
current political climate is rife with fear, distrust, envy, loathing,
exclusion, condescension, indifference, despair, and cynicism. These are
247. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 352 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
248. DANIELLE ALLEN, TALKING TO STRANGERS: ANXIETIES OF CITIZENSHIP SINCE BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION 29 (2004).
249. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 4 (“Deriding ‘political correctness’ becomes a way
for less-privileged whites to express their fury at the snobbery of more-privileged whites.”).
250. For some, of course, the lack of delivery on promises may be inconsequential. See METZL,
supra note 16, at 8.

2019]

Democratic Conditions

621

not the virtues needed for the successful practice of constitutional
democracy, but they may well be the necessary consequences of living in
a society characterized by great disparities of wealth and status; racial
segregation and other forms of discrimination; inequality of opportunity
(particularly with respect to education and employment); inadequate
access to reliable sources of news and information; the presence of
leaders who cynically exploit political polarization for their own
advantage; and the absence of a sense of mutual respect and common
purpose among citizens.
Constitutional democracy is not a form of government that thrives in
barren soil. As we have seen, there are many conditions necessary for
constitutional democracy to flourish, not the least of which are an
independent and unbiased press and a well-educated, well-informed,
alert, and committed electorate. Much more could be said about all of
these necessary conditions of democracy, but this Essay has paid
particular attention to three of them.
First, as our reading of Federalist No. 2 shows, a belief in the
importance of social homogeneity has been a central—and not very
helpful—part of our national story from the beginning. We can see,
therefore, that while our current official narrative is one of inclusion,
rather than exclusion, that narrative stands in tension with our history,
which bespeaks, at best, only a grudging acceptance of those who are in
one way or another unlike ourselves. A preference for exclusion runs
deep. If we are to be more truly inclusive—and that is indeed necessary
to the success of our constitutional democracy—we must be more honest
with ourselves about the depth of that yearning for sameness and the need
to suppress it.
Second, the conventional myth of American democracy is too
simplistic to be helpful in providing a basis for doing what we need to do
to strengthen our system of constitutional democracy. The myth fails to
appreciate the anti-democratic features of our governmental system, and
the contribution they make to the problem of voicelessness. We need to
appreciate the tension that necessarily exists in the concept of
constitutional democracy by virtue of the differences between
constitutionalism and democracy. We can improve our system of
government only if we are mindful of that complexity and open to the
possibility that we may need to adjust the balance between these two
elements.
Finally, constitutional democracy simply cannot continue to exist—
and it certainly cannot flourish—unless the electoral process is fair, and
the people have confidence in its fairness. That is not the case currently
because politicians have successfully gamed many aspects of the
electoral system for their own advantage. In the final analysis, the courts,
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and only the courts, have a fair prospect of being able to remedy that
problem, at least on a large-scale or nationwide basis, but they are no
longer willing to try. Indeed, the courts have not only looked the other
way when the politicians have gamed the system for their own benefit, in
contravention of the common good, the courts have squelched
democracy-enhancing legislation on those rare occasions when
politicians have actually managed to enact it. As we have shown, the
courts once saw clearly their special institutional responsibility for
safeguarding our democratic institutions, and it is essential that they
regain that earlier understanding. There is much work to be done on a
variety of fronts, but these are a few important concerns that must be
addressed if our representative democracy is to be preserved and
strengthened. Justice is not merely the end of government; it is also a
necessary condition of constitutional democracy.

